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SWiAKY
Psychopathy is a subject which is now being duscussed with 
increasing interest in forensic psychiatry, criminology and 
sociological circles. The aim of this thesis is to show that the 
problem of the so-called psychopath is not the province of 
psychiatrists. The reason for this is that the psychiatric 
approach ignores any social or ethical factors in its approach to 
this behavioural problem. The writer attempted to prove that 
social and enviroimental factors are the most crucial in determining 
the condition. In an attempt to rebut the alleged plausibility of 
tlie medico-scientific explanation of this phenomenon, the writer 
produced evidence from various sources in an attempt to show that 
psychopathy stems fromi inadequate upbringing rather than heredity, 
brain damage or disease. As far as the legal position of 
psychopaths is concerned the law (in Scotland and England) seldom 
regards those individuals as mentally abnormal. In the writer's 
opinion the side effect of adopting a relative concept such as 
abnormality, explaining psychopathic behaviour, is hazardous and may 
lead to the use of the legal systemi itself to produce real injustice 
and social harm.
The question of responsibility was also dealt with. It was 
noted that there is no chance for psychopaths to benefit from the 
plea of insanity either in England or in Scotland. Under English 
law a diagnosis of psychopathy is recognised by the courts as an 
acceptable basis for a defence of diminished responsibility in many 
of the cited cases. In Scotland the courts denied the application 
of tlie doctrine to psychopaths. For this reason the legal position 
of psychopaths in England and Scotland is dealt with separately in 
tlie text.
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CHAPTER 1 
THE PSYCHOPATHIC OFFENDER
1. The Problem of Definition
2. The Unreliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis
3. Prediction of Dangerousness
4. Notes
The Problem of Definition
Many descriptions of psychopathic persons exist in literature and 
in psychiatric writings. One of the chief difficulties concerning the 
acceptance of the definitions given by psychiatrists to psychopathy 
is that, the term psychopathic personality has been used in a great 
number of different ways, and at one time or another has been applied to 
almost every sort of abnormal personality type. This renders the term 
confusing and there is no general agreement on just what constitutes 
the characteristics of this type of personality.
Some psychiatrists use the term "sociopathy” to denote a broad 
spectrum of behaviour which is antagonistic to the laws and norms of 
society. It is true that the term implies that a person's misdeed is 
principally directed against society and that he has repeatedly come 
into conflict with its written and unwritten laws but it is difficult 
to accept that this type of behaviour - even where it deviates 
substantially from normal behaviour - is a psychiatric condition. Devia­
tion from normal behaviour is not necessarily an indication of mental 
illness. For example, a man who breaks the law or who views the world 
a little differently from his neighbours is certainly deviating from 
normal behaviour but it would be illogical to classify him as mentally 
ill. Normality here is a relative concept because what is considered 
as normal in one society or at a given time might well be considered as 
abnormal in a different society or at a different time. Surely then 
the concept of deviation from normal behaviour is a poor criterion for
2distinguishing pathological conditions from healthy conditions and 
in this way the psychiatric criterion ends up by being similar to the 
popular distinction between mad and sane i.e. lacking a scientific 
basis. It is detrimental both to an individual and to society to explain 
deviant behaviour by a remotehypothesis like mental illness. Thomas 
Szasz argues that :
"instead of recognizing the deviant as an individual different 
from those who judge him, but nevertheless worthy of their 
respect, he is first discredited as a self-responsible human 
being, and then subjected t^ humiliating punishment defined and 
disguised as treatment ^
A fixed standard of normal behaviour is in any event open to 
discussion since the codes of conduct and prohibitions of the present 
will not necessarily be our standards and guides in the future. It 
is therefore not out of the question to say that the phrase (deviation 
from normal behaviour) comprises many reproachable activities which 
we do not classify as pathological (in the psychiatric sense) unless we 
accept or adopt a very wide use of the term.
Most psychiatrists, however share the opinion that the term 
"psychopathy" implies that the person has no conscience,never 
experiences guilt, remorse or anxiety and that he is never really 
sincere. These are not necessarily psychiatric symptoms which denote 
psychiatric illness as presently defined. It is rare to find someone 
who never experiences guilt, remorse or anxiety. A person may feel 
guilt or anxiety even for his failure in committing a certain crime.
(take for example the traditional custom of taking revenge from a 
family member killer which exists in the Nile Valley especially in some 
remote agricultural areas in Egypt). The feeling of guilt or anxiety
* Those who assert that mental illness is a myth seem to suggest that 
explaining deviant behaviour by mental illness supports the claim that 
psycho-social, ethical and legal deviations can be corrected by medical 
action.
3is likely to exist in every human being including those who are 
classified as psychopaths. Some psychiatrists support this thesis, 
one of them is the American writer Eric Pfeiffer who suggests that:
"such people do at times express feelings of guilt, remorse and anxiety,
but that with them these feelings are of a very fleeting nature, and
[21hence appear to us as false or as shams" . If we can assume that 
the feelings of guilt, remorse and anxiety are mere manifestations of 
fear, then we can conclude that the experience or the knowledge of 
fear (which is inherited from our animal and human anscestors or 
acquired during life experience) is responsible for producing those 
feelings. But the absence of a reliable guide (namely a good under­
standing of the nature of human behaviour)as to what is going on inside 
the individual causes the difficulty and leads us to deny the existence 
of such feelings. The point at issue, however, is not the absence of 
these feelings (for they are always there) but rather the absence of 
the objectivity of such feelings. Thus it will be more reasonable to 
say that these individuals do feel guilt and anxiety but they cannot 
manifest or express those feelings with any degree of objectivity. But 
this lack of objective feeling of guilt and anxiety should not necessarily 
be constructed or interpreted as indicating the absence of these 
feelings.
It has been suggested that the emotional peculiarities shown by the 
psychopath are usually seen in one of two forms; the emotions shown 
are either excessive or inadequate. This idea is advocated by many 
psychiatrists, for example Curran, Partridge and Storey suggest that 
these two peculiarities may be found in the same person as when a 
psychopath may be quite untouched by some cruel and conscienceless
act that he has committed, but may show an excessively emotional 
tantrum on being himself criticised
If this hypothesis is accepted, then it would seem that the 
feelings are there but they are misdirected, not controlled or 
inadequately placed and they need to be properly instructed and 
directed towards the benefit of the individual and society.
This apparent falseness of feelings may be observed in other 
types of disordered behaviour for example in hysterical behaviour. If 
this is true, then we may understand that mental illness (organic or 
functional) in some cases is accompanied by what has been described as 
psychopathic behaviour or psychopathic tendencies, and many psychiatrists, 
with this in mind, try to tie this phenomenon to mental illness. Going 
on with this process of labelling psychiatrists sometimes classify 
individuals who are suffering from severe emotional disturbances or 
experiencing inner conflicts and who engage in anti-social behaviour 
as symptomatic, secondary or neurotic psychopaths, but;
"one of the difficulties with terms such as secondary and 
neurotic "psychopathy" is that they imply that individuals 
so labelled are basically psychopaths. However, this is 
likely to be misleading because the motivations behind 
their behaviour, as well as their personality structure, 
life history, response to treatment, and prognosis, are 
very different from those of the psychopath ... Many 
individuals exhibit aggressive, anti-social behaviour, not 
because they are psychopathic or emotionally disturbed, 
but because they have grown upin adelinquent subculture or 
in an environment that fosters and rewards such behaviour.
Their behaviour, although considered deviant by society's 
standard, is nevertheless consonant with that of their own 
group, gang or family" [4]
This, however, reveals the vagueness of the psychiatric definition, 
and the problem still needs to be solved rationally and humanely rather
than arbitrarily. What we should be concerned with is the behavioural 
problem a patient has not the label hung around his neck.
However, some psychiatrists may argue that the label is necessary 
for treatment and prognosis and for enabling doctors to communicate 
with one another. But this will not be convincing or of practical 
value unless we are in a position to judge that these people are 
psychiatrically treatable and that treatment is available for them. The 
question, is there any evidence to support the availability of and 
susceptability to, treatment, is not easy to answer in the case of the 
psychopath . Individuals put together under the diagnostic category
"psychopathy" are generally regarded as untreatable because no single 
type of treatment is expected to cure the variety of disorders which 
fall under such a heading. It has been said that the number of 
psychopathic types designated has risen as high as 16. It is clear 
therefore that the use of the term "psychopathy" is not sufficiently 
precise. The result will be that the doctor can have no clear idea 
of desirable treatment or prognosis. Halleck reported that:
"repeated efforts to replace the phrase "psychopathic 
personality" with friendlier terms such as "sociopathic 
personality", "neurotic character" or "simple adult 
maladjustment" have met with limited success. The term 
"psychopath" seems to be retained because it has communicative 
value" [5]^
If this is the case and some psychiatrists are still insisting on 
retaining the term (which has no meaning other than indicating that 
certain individuals exhibit anti-social and criminal conduct in excessive 
way) then it will be more reasonable to use it only as indication 
of the severity of other disorders. This is acceptable since anti­
social and criminal conduct also exist in many other well established 
psychiatric conditions. That means the term should not be used to
indicate a separate clinical entity.
The label therefore does not actually make the difference between 
human responses to, for example treatment and the alternative of punish­
ment. In fact in the case of the psychopath, the so-called treatment 
efficiently amounts to punishment since the terms "psychopathy" and 
"anti-social criminal behaviour" have become almost the same.
Where psychopathy is a recognised syndrome and where its existence 
is defined in psychiatric terms, then to equate it solely with anti­
social behaviour is both meaningless and dangerous since it uses 
psychiatry in the unacceptable way of merely serving the interests of 
the correctional or penal process rather than in its medical role of 
healing or curing. This may always, of course, be a problem which 
psychiatry has, but it may be exacerbated in the case of the psychopath, 
Szasz pointed out that:
"there is evidence to suggest that psychiatrists may be more 
punitive toward persons defined as mental patients (especially 
if they are labeled "dangerous" as well), than prison personnel 
toward persons defined as criminals"[6].
Craft mentioned that:
"at a 1962 conference near London, groups of prison medical 
officers and practising hospital psychiatrists were first asked 
whether the term "psychopath" was a necessary one for penal 
and psychiatric thought. The reply was that some term was 
needed to designate those persons who, although apparently 
rational and in possession of good intelligence, yet seemed at 
the mercy of their emotional needs, at crucial, often frequent, 
periods of time. If the term "psychopath" was not used, some 
other term would be necessary with which to discuss the socio­
logical and treatment needs of this group of people"
The answer given to the question in the above statement is 
confusing, for the reason that the term "psychopathic personality" may
be used to designate every conceivable type of abnormal character 
and this is why it is impossible to define "psychopathy" with any 
precision. In addition medical treatment is designed to solve only 
medical problems and not those problems whose existence had been defined 
and established on non-medical grounds.
According to Rees:
"the various definitions applied to psychopathic personality
have four common features:
(1) Exluding cause, Viz, the condition does not amount
to mental defect, he is not insane or psychoneurotic; 
whether or not the person is of low intelligence it 
is independent of subnormality and mental illness.
(2) Time factor. The abnormality exists throughout life 
or from a comparatively early age and is usually 
recurrent, episodic or persistent.
(3) Description of behaviour. Viz. anti-social, unable to 
accept social requirements on account of abnormal 
peculiarities of impulse, temperament or character; 
conduct is abnormally aggressive or irresponsible.
(4) Personality characteristics which have been described 
as part of psychopathy are marked egocentricity lack 
of sincerity, lack of feeling and lack of guilt." [8].
These four common features imply that the concept of psychopathy 
lies outside the range of psychiatry.
The first of these four common features place the condition far 
from the two major groups of mental illness i.e. the psychoses and the 
neuroses.
The time factor is of no value here since some other psychiatric 
abnormalities exist also throughout life and are also recurrent, episodic 
or persistent (e.g. anxiety states, hysteria,schizophrenia etc.).
Third, the description of behaviour is not in itself a good 
criterion for defining mental illness since there is a lack of clear 
etiological knowledge. There must also be some sort of relationship 
between symptoms and etiological factors. For example there is a 
close relationship between organic causes and organic states. The 
former comprises the assessment of the physical, psychological and 
constitutional factors and their relative importance in bringing about 
the condition in question. The latter consists of the syndrome that is 
observed. In the case of the "psychopath" the causes have not been satis­
factorily established and hence the reference to etiology was entirely 
ommitted. Accordingly a complete psychiatric diagnosis is not fulfilled 
by a mere description of a clinical picture. In other cases when 
attempting to make a complete diagnosis psychiatrists usually distinguish 
the descriptive aspect from the causal aspect and do not ignore the 
past history and the environment of the patient.
Finally, personality characteristics which have been described 
as part of the condition i.e. 'egocentricity, lack of feeling and lack 
of guilt', are all referring to a patient's communications about 
himself, others and the world about him and therefore do not constitute 
good grounds for establishing the existence of a psychiatric condition. 
The reason for this is that, the term mental illness was only applied 
here to observable patterns of behaviour and not to states of mind or 
body. To this extent the so-called characteristics of the psychopathic 
personality represent only a terminology or a definition not meaning­
fully related to observable conduct. Most of these characteristics are 
found in quite ordinary people. But not every one who is different
9is psychopathic. Surely the essential difference between regarding
people as weird or eccentric, and calling them psychopathic relates
in great measure to the nature and perhaps the extent of the deviance.
The term "psychopathic personality" is given to any one who has
substantially different standards of behaviour from those generally
accepted by the society. Some of these persons may be inadequate that
is to say, although perfectly intelligent, unable to earn their own
living. Others are the creative people, who as in the case of Van
Gogh, did many eccentric things but also many productive things. The
concept of psychopathy is clearly too broad so that it could be used
to identify every individual repeatedly demonstrating non conforming
behaviour. But the difficulty here is that :anti-social personalities
are a mixed group of individuals who nevertheless have certain
characteristics in common, and for this reason the terms "psychopathic"
and "anti-social" are sometimes used interchangeably to refer to these
behaviour patterns. To this extent we could diagnose non-criminals as
"psychopaths" because anti-social behaviour is not always looked at
as criminal conduct. But recent psychiatric studies showed that
psychopathy is one of the principle psychiatric conditions associated
with criminality. For example, Halleck pointed out that; "psychopaths
f9 lare usually described as being specially prone to criminality" . In 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, anti-social personality was used 
to describe those individuals who repeatedly encountered difficulty 
with the law
Smith in his study "The psychopath in Society" mentioned that:
"since the World Health Organization (WHO) has begun work 
on systematizing diagnostic classifications world wide, 
the term anti-social personality (301-7) has been introduced 
and is gaining currency as the term for designating 
psychopaths (WHO, 1972)" [11]^
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The important question here is : does non criminal psychopathic 
behaviour really exist? If the answer is in the affirmative, then it 
contradicts with the four common features of the definitions introduced
ri2iby Rees , because these definitions do not speak about mental symptoms 
but rather fairly and clearly enough place the condition far from the 
two major groups of mental illness i.e. the psychoses and the neuroses.
We may however reach the conclusion that we cannot diagnose any 
individual as a psychopath unless he deliberately and repeatedly 
violates the law. This in fact is no more than an unnecessary widening 
to the motion of mental illness which is something more than a 
response to or a reaction against, social and environmental conditions. 
This approach has been rejected by some psychiatrists even in cases 
where the responses or reactions fit in better with the medical model, 
for example, Laing and Esterson in their unique study of schizophrenia 
state that:
" psychiatry has been particularly concerned with individual 
experiences and behaviour regarded in our society as abnormal.
In an effort to bring psychiatry into line with neurology and 
medicine in general, attempts have been made to categorize 
such experience and behaviour into 'symptoms' and 'signs' 
of supposedly pathological syndromes or illnesses" [13]^
By the same token, the psychopath's anti-social and criminal activities 
have been categorized as "symptoms" and "signs" of mental illness.
But criminal anti-social conduct and mental illness are clearly not 
necessarily one and the same thing. The law does not equate 
criminality with mental illness. Indeed if it did, then all criminals 
would be treated not punished. The dangers inherent in making such 
an assumption are best illustrated by Halleck:
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"If the psychiatrist can be persuaded to argue that an offender 
should not be held responsible for behaviour which is largely 
determined by unconscious factors, then perhaps the sociologist 
should be required to argue that poverty, discrimination and 
delinquent association would also make the offender non- 
responsible. Either approach would be compatible with a 
deterministic viewpoint"
Obviously this approach endangers the existence of the free-will 
theory which is a corner stone of the criminal law. The free-will 
theory cannot simply be replaced by an unverified hypothesis of assumed 
mental illness, Malcolm Lader has said:
"To medicalize this by assigning such people to psychiatric 
care merely underlines our ignorance of the causes of 
social deviance .... It is not only illogical but hazardous 
to infer mental illness solely on the basis of anti-social 
behaviour" [13]
Crime is fundamentally a socio-legal and not a medical concept. 
Since legal and moral codes can be seen to change with culture, time 
and place, our assessment of the anti-social conduct will inevitably 
be relative and flexible. This, of course, will not be a reliable 
criterion for classifying those who are engaged in anti-social 
activities as mentally ill. But if this idea were to be accepted, 
some acts which are legal now could become illegal in the future and 
vice-versa. To support this view, Sir Norwood East has said:
"World War II and post-war legislation introduced new 
offences. Perhaps most of us in consequence have become 
occasional offenders and it may be assumed that some 
existing prohibitions will disappear as circumstances 
permit. Again, a person who is drunk and disorderly 
in his own house commits no offence, but on the same showing 
is an offender in a public place. According to the 
thesis crime is at one time or place a disease and not 
at another, and it would seem that Parliament can add to the 
diseased population by making new prohibitions" [16],
1 2
Crime is a relative concept and this is quite obvious to the 
degree that there is no need to give examples here. Some psychiatrists 
may ignore this fact and at the same time ignore the social element 
in criminal conduct by simply interpreting anti-social behaviour in 
terms of mental illness. Sutherland, in his study of white collar 
crime, went to ask whether we are to think that:
"the crimes of the Ford Motor Company are due to the Oedipus 
Complex, or those of the Aluminium Company of America to 
an Inferiority Complex, or those of the U.S. Steel Corporation 
to Frustration and Aggression, or those of Dupont to 
Traumatic Experience or those of Montgomery Ward to Regression 
to infancy?" [17],
or - one may add - those of the numerous politicians and generals of 
our time to psychopathy?
This verbal war between sociologists and some psychiatrists 
serves the purpose of this paper to the extent that it reveals the 
fact that without the existence of social and criminal systems 
psychopathy as a concept would not exist. Lady Wootton in her famous 
book 'Social Science and Social Pathology* points out that:
"If mental health and ill-health cannot be defined in objective 
scientific terms that are free of subjective moral judgements, 
it follows that we have no reliable criterion by which to 
distinguish the sick from the healthy mind. The road is then 
wide open for those who wish to classify all forms of anti­
social, or at least of criminal behaviour as symptoms of 
mental disorder" [18]
In the case of the "psychopath" she went on to demonstrate the 
absence of the relationship between psychiatric diagnosis and 
symptomatology. She says, for example.
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"In his case no such symptoms can be diagnosed because it 
is just the absence of them which causes him to be 
classified as psychopathic. He is, in fact, par excellence, 
and without shame or qualifications, the model of the circular 
process by which mental abnormality is inferred from anti­
social behaviour while anti-social behaviour is explained 
by mental abnormality" [19],
No doubt, the absurdity of this approach will lead eventually to 
the elimination of the concept of responsibility for it is true that, 
as Lady Wootton put it:
"If you are consistently (in old-fashioned language) wicked 
enough, you may hope to be excused from responsibility 
for your misdeeds; but if your wickedness is only moderate, 
or if you show occasional signs of repentence or reform, 
then you must expect to take the balme for what you do and 
perhaps also to be punished for it" [20],
Then the sensible view must be that, many individuals present 
social rather than medical problems, as in the case of the psychopath. 
The decision as to whether a man is mentally ill or not does not 
purely depend upon social inadequacy, but in addition to this, upon 
the presence of other symptoms, so that the whole picture can 
reasonably be regarded as constituting what is known as a "psychiatric 
condition". Unfortunately in the case of the psychopath, this 
approach was not recognized by many psychiatrists. Instead a man is 
classified as a "psychopath" precisely because he has no symptoms.
And he, as Lady Wootton has suggested:
"is trapped in circular definition : he is a psychopath 
because he has committed anti-social acts, but these 
are explained by his personality disorder. The more 
brutal and remorseless his crime the more likely he is 
to be excused responsibility for it on psychiatric 
grounds" [21]^
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The Unreliability of Psychia.fe^ njjc Diagnosis
The diagnosis of mental abnormality cannot always be inferred 
from the mere exhibition of unusual or remarkable behaviour, be this 
criminal or not. It depends upon the presence of associated 
symptoms and at the same time upon distinguishing causal from 
descriptive aspects. The reliability of psychiatric diagnosis, 
however, is generally not very impressive.
According to Matarazo : "research findings which reveal diagnostic
judgements based on psychiatric interviews to be unreliable, outnumber
[221
those studies which show that they are reliable"
More recent studies also provide little confidence in the reliability 
or validity ofdiagnosing mental illness and predicting its consequences. 
Halleck (1971) pointed out that:
"Psychiatrists could help society immeasurably, however, if 
they would frankly admit that current diagnostic categories 
do not have much scientific meaning - that they are largely 
arbitrary. Then society might be able to confront rationally 
and humanely the moral question raised by those who behave 
differently" [23]^
In most psychiatric writings and in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual, the diagnostic category, anti-social personality is reserved 
for :
"individuals who are basically unsocialized and whose behaviour 
pattern brings them repeatedly into conflict with society. They 
are incapable of significant loyalty to individuals, groups, 
or social values. They are grossly selfish, callous, irresponsible, 
impulsive and unable to feel guilt or to learn from experience 
and punishment. Frustration tolerance is low. They tend to 
blame others or offer plausible rationalization for their 
behaviour" [24]
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It is clear that psychiatrists choose to conceptualize
(psychopathic behaviour) in a descriptive way which make it possible to
understand it in a variety of ways. A psychopath, for instance,
could be thought of as possessed by supernatural powers, suffering
from a disease, the product of heredity or his environment, or
the combined result of internal and external factors. This description
however, has always been a problem for psychiatric diagnosis, and
although some psychiatrists are of the opinion that psychiatric
[25]
diagnosis is essentially a shorthand description , others suggest 
that this attitude has led to a great and widely recognized weakness 
of psychiatric diagnostic methods.
According to Eysenck:
"Psychiatrists often speak of various syndromes, such as anxiety 
state, reactive depression, fatigue syndrome, hypochondria, 
hysteria, psychasthenia, obsessional-compulsive personality, 
and many more. When encountered in the text books these can 
be described and no doubt present a reasonably orderly picture, 
but in actual fact few patients fall clearly and cleanly into 
one or the other of these categories; most show symptoms 
characteristic of more than one symdrome and some show symptoms 
from all. Even worse : a person who at one time may seem to 
fall fairly clearly into one group may at another time fall 
into quite a different one" [26],
Medical dictionaries define diagnosis as the art of distinguishing 
one disease from another. Taking this definition, it becomes easy to identify 
the problems of psychiatric diagnosis, which may require to be made 
in the absence of clear physical symptoms.i
The usefulness and reliability of psychiatric decision-making 
or diagnosis has been attacked on many different grounds. For example, 
the clinician is sometimes faced with a condition or a patient with
16
clinical features suggesting two different conditions. This may 
happen when the psychiatrist have variant sources of information about 
his patient (e.g. one psychiatrist may speak with the patient's 
family while another does not). This informaion variance and over­
lapping of symptoms make it very difficult for the psychiatrist to 
reach an accurate judgement. This however, may also apply to non­
psychiatric medicine but what makes it harder for the psychiatrist is 
that his diagnosis (unlike the diagnosis of physical conditions) is not 
backed or corroborated by laboratory tests or reliable investigations. 
Consequently psychiatric diagnosis is, in most cases, no more than a 
personal judgement made by the psychiatrist. Another difficulty with 
the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis is that it may not stand the 
test of time. In other words, if we go back half a century we find that 
those who are now labelled as psychopaths were then said to be morally 
"insane". Some may argue that the advance of medical science and 
medical discoveries make it possible now to diagnose the "morally insane" 
as "constitutional psychopathic inferiors". But there is no scientific 
evidence to support this diagnosis which now stands only on the basis 
of the psychopath's behaviour.
Many studies and researches done in the area suggest strongly 
the unreliability of psychiatric diagnosis and the questionable 
usefulness of the classificatory system adopted by clinicians. Differ­
ent investigators (psychiatrists, sociologists and lawyers etc.) are 
engaged in this process. What follows is an outline of the conclusions 
suggested by some of these investigators.
In detailed review of literature in this area, Ennis and Litwack 
state that:
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"psychiatrie diagnosis using these (traditional diagnostic) categories
[271
are not very reliable"
The account given by Eysenck of the weakness of psychiatric 
diagnostic methods also tends to support the view, already expressed, 
that they are unreliable . As Eysenck says:
"different psychiatrists diagnosing the same set of patients, 
come up with quite divergent diagnostic labels for the same 
people. When well trained psychiatrists, who have received 
the same sort of training and have agreed on definitions of 
the various categories, are asked to give diagnosis of one 
and the same set of patients, independently of each other, 
agreement is seldom better than 20 percent - leaving 80 
percent to chance, to individual biases and notions, and 
other irrelevant factors. Agreement on whether a particular 
illness is neurotic as opposed to psychotic is of course 
better than that, but even here there are many sources of 
disagreement, some of them quite far-reaching. Thus American 
psychiatrists have a very extended concept of schizophrenia, 
embracing many other psychotic and neurotic states that in 
Britain and Europe generally would be diagnosed as depressive, 
or psychopathic, or hysterical" [28],
Professor Eysenck showed:
"in one study, comparing diagnostic habits in the USA and Britain 
that similar groups of patients (and in one case an identical 
group of patients) were diagnosed as schizophrenic five times 
as frequently by the psychiatrists trained in the USA as by
those trained in B r i t a i n ! " [29]
The case of the so-called psychopath represents a troublesome 
dilemma for the psychiatric diagnostician. The fact that the psycho­
path has no symptoms other than his criminal anti-social behaviour 
makes the process of diagnosis very difficult and consequently the 
concept of psychopathy will become meaningless outside the prison.
This is because there is not enough scientific evidence to support the
diagnosis. In addition social factors, while important, are not
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sufficient to justify a diagnosis of mental illness.
The conclusions reached by Hare and Schalling in their investigation 
in this area are here in point:
"A more important source of confusion arises from the diagnosis 
of psychopathic personality as a "waste basket" category.
Any individual who displays a general tendency towards anti­
social activity, but for whom there is no other suitable 
psychiatric classification, is often called psychpathic"
If this is the case then the psychiatric diagnosis of psychopathy
will not be a discovery but only an invention designed to fit all or
some of those who are engaged in anti-social activity. This sounds
like modifying facts to suit the theory instead of the theory being
the logical explanation of the facts. Therefore some writers
suggest that where mental illness is concerned, the criterion of
abnormality should be firmly rooted in a disturbance of psychological
function in the same way as the criterion of physical abnormality is
rooted in a disturbance of physiological function. One of these
writers is Lewis, who wrote that: " deviant, maladapted, non-conformist
behaviour is pathological only if it is accompanied by a manifest
f311disturbance of one or more such functions" . He went on to say:
"disorder of function must be detectable at a discrete or 
differnetiated level that is hardly conceivable when mental 
activity as a whole is taken as the irreducible datum. If 
non-conformity can be detected only in total behaviour, 
while all the particular psychological functions seem 
unimpaired, health will be presumed not illness" [32]^
Lady Wootton seems to support Lewis’s view when she argued that:
"This criterion has many virtues. Cheif of these is its 
strength as a defence against the circular argument which 
explains anti-social behaviour by ill-health, while 
inferring the ill-health from the behaviour. By the use
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of this criterion the sick are always to be distinguished 
from the healthy by the fact that there is something else 
peculiar about them, beside their inability to keep the 
rules of the social game" [33].
One of the chief endeavours of this work, however, is to succeed 
in establishing that "psychopathy" is a social rather than a 
psychiatric condition. Lewis,however,seems not to favour this 
view when he insists that: "one can be sociopathic without being 
psychopathic" However, if the only evidence of psychopathy
is the anti-social behaviour, then this in itself does not support 
the view that psychopathy is a distinct psychiatric condition. For, 
as Walker observed: "if the psychopath did not behave anti-socially 
we might hesitate to label him as such" . Walker further
explains that;
"some psychiatrists - notably in the United States - confine 
the term to people whose abnormality includes anti-social 
sexual conduct, and the term is used in this narrow sense 
in some states penal codes. In the penal codes of other 
states, and in the English Mental Health Act, it is used in 
the wider sense which includes abnormally aggressive or 
irresponsible conduct. In the Scottish Mental Health Act, 
such conduct is also recognized as grounds for compulsory 
admission, but is not called psychopathy" [36]^
Many writers, have expressed doubt that psychopathy can be treated
[371as a unique clinical entity , (see for example, Hare 1970, 
pp. 10-12). According to Ziskind : " A major problem in the diagnosis 
of sociopathy or psychopathy stems from (i) the lack of generally 
accepted definition and (ii) the lack of a precise recognition of the 
sociopath"
It is fair, however, to say that definitional uncertainties and 
operational difficulties undermine the validity of diagnosis of 
"psychopathy" and render it unreliable.
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The Problem of Prediction
The purpose of psychiatric diagnosis is not only the simple recogni­
tion of mental disorders. Psychiatric decisions are also relied upon 
to predict future behaviour or dangerousness, and hence to determine 
a patient's need for future hospitalization.
The process of prediction is essential for estimating future 
risks. In the field of medicine the aim is to prevent disease. In 
the field of criminology the aim is to estimate risks of criminality 
which are genuinely in the future, and to prevent the origin of 
criminal careers.
We have already observed that certain criminal behaviour is 
interpreted as evidence of psychopathy and that the psychopath shows 
no other symptoms independent of his criminal anti-social behaviour.
In addition, most of these (patients) are usually referred to the 
psychiatrist by courts, police, prison officers, relatives or families 
usually complaining of their inadequate and aggressive conduct.
It will be understood therefore that the deviations of behaviour 
referred to the psychiatrist often appear to be selected arbitrarily 
by custom and tradition rather than on the basis of scientifically 
established fact. One of the most striking and consistent observation 
about psychopathy has been its greater incidence in men as compared 
to women. This however may imply that the probablp criterion for the 
diagnosis "psychopathy" is criminality since the detected or reported 
offences committed by males outnumber those committed by females in 
every country in the world. This may in turn suggest that these
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clinical diagnosis were validated by criminal statistics and criminal 
records.
Psychiatrists are still not agreed on the existence of psychopathy
as specific clinical entity. This makes it very difficult to distinguish
between the so-called psychopath and the normal recidivist. Halleck
who considered psychopathy "as an abstract state rather than a definite 
[391syndrome" , explains the disagreement between psychiatrists by
stating that;
"even within psychiatry there is a widespread disagreement as 
to whether psychopathy is a form of mental illness, a form 
of evil or a form of fiction. Most of the major disagreements 
within psychiatric criminology have originated in efforts to 
understand and treat psychopathic personality" [^0],
Further, if it is accepted that there is no firm definition of 
psychopathy, there is every reason to believe that psychiatric prediction 
is of questionable validity. The diffuse nature of the definition 
of psychopathy which is solely in behavioural terms and does not 
constitute a full medical diagnosis, offers little help for the process 
of predicting future risks.
Despite all these problems, many psychiatrists and mental health 
professionals are currently engaged in the task of deciding who it is 
who tomorrow or the next day will be dangerous. But many other 
prominent psychiatrists support the contention that psychiatric predic­
tions of dangerousness have been consistently characterized by low 
levels of validity. Cleckley, for example, who describes the psychopath 
as an "unreliable personality" suggests that this quality (the
unreliability) makes the task of predicting the psychopath's future 
behaviour a difficult one. He says:
2 2
"The psychopath's unreliability and his disregard for 
obligations and for consequences are manifested in both 
triviai and serious matters, are masked by demonstrations 
of conforming behaviour, and cannot be accounted for by 
ordinary motives or incentives. Although it can be 
confidently predicted that his failures and idsloyalties 
will continue, it is impossible to time them and to take 
satisfactory precautions against their effect. Here it 
might be said, is not even a consistency in inconsistency 
but an inconsistency in inconsistency" [42]^
Cleckley's view as a psychiatrist seems to support the idea 
that psychopathy is an outcome of problems in living rather than 
mental disorder. He carefully admitted that the concept of 
psychopathy lies outside the range of psychiatry when he pointed out 
that :
"the faulty reactions in living which these patients show are 
indeed difficult to describe without sometimes using terms 
that come more readily to moralists or sociologists or lay­
men than to psychiatrists. The customary psychiatric 
terminology does not, I believe, offer a range of concepts 
into which we can fit these people successfully" [43]^
If it is true that it is difficult to describe the psychopath's 
faulty reactions in living without using sociological or moral terms, 
then the implication will be that the psychopath's future behaviour 
or dangerousness equally cannot be predicted or estimated by psychiatric 
methods.
In fact, there are actually no psychiatric methods for handling 
this sensitive task other than the personal opinion that stems from 
the professional experience of the psychiatrist. Halleck seems to 
support this view when he says that:
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"The most a psychiatrist can say is that he has had consider­
able experience in dealing with disturbed people who commit 
dangerous acts, that he has been designated by society to 
diagnose and treat such individuals, and that his skill in 
treating dangerous behaviour in those diagnosed as mentally 
ill has generally been appreciated" [44]^
This is no more than a personal judgement and it may lead to 
contracdiction and inaccuracy in the process of evaluating or 
anticipating future behaviour, since psychiatrists naturally do not 
have the same standard of experience. And even if we ignore this, 
there are such factors as the lack of clear etiological knowledge and 
definitional precision which are enough to plague the process of 
prediction. Despite all these facts, some psychiatrists express 
confidence in their ability to handle a task which is admittedly 
difficult. Many other psychiatrists for example, Cleckley, Szasz, 
Greenland criticize this approach and find no justification for
it except that some psychiatrists exaggerate their power. All the above 
mentioned psychiatrists are of the opinion that the issue of dangerous­
ness is a matter of public concern and not the responsibility of one 
professional system.
In any event, however, prediction of dangerousness is always 
difficult and is likely to be more so in the case of the psychopath 
because the causes of his behaviour are unclear. Furthermore it is 
uncertain whether or not psychiatric prediction is appropriate since 
there is no evidence to support the idea that psychopathy is a medical 
condition. Therefore a reasonable approach may be to replace the 
psychiatric prediction of dangerousness by public adjudication which 
will be conducted under supervision of the court who will see that
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decision-makers employ proper criteria and reached reasonable
conclusions. The task of assessing dangerousness and estimating
future risks may be done efficiently when the court receives different
information about the subject from various people (e.g. social workers,
school authorities, legal officers and the subjects' relatives). This
may present a more complete picture of the psychopath’s future behaviour
than could be obtained by psychiatric professionals. The rationale of 
this social prediction is clear enou^. If children with delinquent 
tendencies could be spotted before they commit their offences, then it 
might be possible to save them from getting into trouble with the law. 
Perhaps by giving them and their parents additional support and by 
providing facilities lacking in the environment.
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CHAPTER 2 
CHARACTERISTICS AND ETIOLOGY
This chapter is primarily concerned with the typical characteristics 
of the "psychopath". The etiology of this phenomenon will be considered 
in the terms outlined in Chapter 1 supra. Thus the underlying hypothesis 
will be that "psychopathic" behaviour is not a product of mental illness 
but rather a manifestation of behavioural disorder caused by faulty 
upbringing and social difficulties.
Characteristics ;
Before discussing questions relating to etiology, the general
characteristics of the psychopath which appear in all psychiatric
writings and in the second edition of APA Diagnostic and Statistical 
[ 1 ]Manual , will be considered. Although these characteristics are 
typical of psychopaths, they are not generally all found in a 
particular case. Commonly identified characteristics are as follows:
1. Lack of conscience or feeling.
2. Impulsivity; inability to delay gratification.
3. Inability to profit from mistakes and rejection of authority.
4. Lack of emotion ties to other people.
5. Inadequate anti-social conduct.
6. Ability to make good impression on others.
Lack of Conscience or Feeling:
It has been said that the "psychopath" is always distinguished 
by pathologic egocentricity and incapacity for love. This may suggest 
that the "psychopath" bases his personal morality on self interest.
That is to say, the psychopath is a self centered person who lacks
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the capacity to love other people. Cleckley suggests that: "This is
usually of a degree not seen in ordinary people and often is little
[21
short of astonishing" . This statement indicates that the psycho­
path's anti-social behaviour differs in degree from the normal person. 
But could we interpret or understand this lack of feeling which differs 
only in degree from the normal person, in terms of mental illness?
If the answer to this question is in the affirmative then the 
result will naturally be the unnecessary broadening of the definition of 
mental illness and this would greatly complicate the question of 
criminal responsibility. If anti-social behaviour is invariably thought 
of as being caused by mental illness then all those who act anti- 
socially should not be considered as responsible for their actions. Such 
a deterministic viewpoint will result not only in depriving the 
individual of his capacity to exercise his choice, but also in denying 
the validity of the concept of free will which is a corner stone of the 
criminal law.
It is very difficult to accept that lack of conscience in these 
individuals is attributable to mental illness since there is no 
satisfactory medical evidence to support the idea. It will be more 
reasonable to assume that this lack of conscience came as a result of 
faulty upbringing and social difficulties. It is generally accepted 
that every human being is born without any social qualities, but that 
his parents and the environment around convert him into a special 
type of person. The underlying meaning of this will be that the 
process of upbringing and environmental causes play a vital role in the 
formation of human conscience as transmitted to the child by his
parents. In the case of the "psychopath" who shows no symptoms other 
than his anti-social conduct, there remains only the man himself. The
man who was not or was incapable of being adequately socialized or 
disciplined by his parents in early childhood.
Impulsivity; inability to delay gratification
The psychopath was said to show from an early age an abnormality 
of character marked by tendencies to act on impulse to satisfy his 
immediate need. But again in this it is possible to argue that the 
"psychopath" differs only in degree from normal well-adjusted people.
He, like most other maladaptive people, chooses the wrong means to 
satisfy his needs and that means he lacks the power to control his 
desires in the same way as the alcoholic cannot control his cravings 
for drink. This, however, may be indicative of social maladaptation 
rather than of something else, for example, mental illness.
The impulsivity of the "psychopath" (as an established pattern 
of maladaptive behaviour) may produce behavioural symptoms similar 
to those found in other psychiatric disorders. From an early age 
the psychopath was not taught to delay his gratification or to 
control his desires i.e. his parents failed to make good behaviour 
habitual with them. As a child, he may have been extremely deprived 
of affection leading him to live for the moment, not for the future.
He does not feel secure about the future and so he lives for the moment 
and has grown up addicted to that. Rees explains that:
" consistent security lays the foundation for the transformation 
of the energies of the primitive impulses into activities which 
satisfy the child, are acceptable to others, and achieve r,-i
better emotional , intellectual, social and ethical development"
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There is also strong evidence to suggest that parental rejection 
or neglect plays a major role in bringing psychopathy to existence. 
Zax and Cowen state that;
"..since the aggressive behaviour and poor self control seen 
in the rejected child are somewhat similar (italics) to what 
is seen in the adult psychopath, it is inferred that parental r.-i 
rejection plays a key role in the development of psychopathy"
Zax and Cowen believe that parental rejection represent a background 
factor in the etiology of psychopathy despite the fact that this 
has not been universally accepted.
Inability to profit from mistakes and rejection of authority
The psychopath who is incapable of remorse and devoid of 
conscience is unable to profit from mistakes simply because he does 
not consider them mistakes. The lack of conscience in the psycho­
path affects internal controls and makes him totally dependent on 
his instincts which cannot be modified without the effective inter­
ference of the conscience. Like a wild animal the psychopath acts 
and reacts instinctively without consideration for the consequences 
and the outcome of the consequences e.g. punishment. This is mainly 
due to the absence of an internalised system of authority. For this 
reason the psychopath sees nothing particularly wrong with his 
behaviour and hence disbelieves in the fairness of his punishment.
He may believe that those who inflict punishment upon him are truly 
the ones who deserve punishment. Eventually he may reject any form of 
external authority upon him and this leads him to violate the laws of 
society. As Hare has put it, the psychopath: " cannot understand the 
reasons for society's objections to his behaviour nor the punishment 
meted out by it" This is because the psychopath does not think
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of himself as committing wrong. Like a naturally wild animal he acts 
instinctively and that is because he has no self-control or conscience. 
(I am using the word conscience here independent of any moral sense i.e. 
in the sence of its existence or non-existence as a power of self 
control). Unlike conscience, instinct is inborn behaviour which does 
not have to be learned, while conscience is the product of learning and 
the parents play a vital role in the formation of the conscience or the 
super-ego as psychologists call it. Zax and Cowen state that: "The
super-ego comes into existence through identification with parents who 
reward certain actions and punish others" It is therefore when
something goes wrong with the process of learning that psychopathy is 
likely to eventuate.
Lack of emotional ties to other people
The psychopath who is described in literature as unstable, unrelia­
ble and impulsive is characterised by a lack of emotional ties to 
other people. He may be hyperactive in moving from place to place 
or from relationship to relationship and will rarely have long term 
commitments. The result, of course, will be a complete failure in 
establishing any real or permanent relationship or ties. One possible 
explanation of this behaviour may be that, the psychopath as a child 
was extremely deprived of love, consistent security and consistent 
parental example which followed a certain code of morals and ethics.
He was not taught that a human being can commit himself lovingly to 
another person. As a result he cannot tie himself to another person 
in a permanent relationship and for him nothing lasts. If therefore 
the formation of permanent relationships with him and the emotional 
acceptance of his behaviour are considered as precondition for treatment
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then it will be nearer the truth to say that he is untreatable. 
Cleckley's experience with psychopaths led him to conclude that;
"This lack in the psychopath makes it all but impossible 
for an adequate emotional rapport to arise in his treatment 
and may be an important factor in the therapeutic failure 
that, in my experience, has been universal"
Inadequate anti-social conduct
The "psychopath" who lacks loyalty to any code of morals or 
ethics is characterised by inadequate behaviour and social irrespon­
sibility. That is not because his code of conduct differs from that 
of the society but because there is actually no code of conduct at 
all in his case. The classification of "psychopath's" made by Scott 
and quoted by Rees^^^ are important in this connection. They are as 
follows :
1. Persons trained to anti-social standards.
2. Reparative behaviour.
3. The untrained offender.
4. Rigid fixations.
The first category i.e. persons trained to anti-social standards, should 
not be considered as psychopaths because they are loyal to their own 
code of conduct which is normal in their families and environment. Their 
behaviour is considered as anti-social only because their view of 
right and wrong differs from that of the wider society. An example of 
this is found in the Western Sudan in some remote areas in the "Nuba" 
Mountains. Stealing among these western Nubians is intended as a means 
to gain prestige in order to qualify for a respectable marriage. Although 
their code of morals differs from that of the larger society they are
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nevertheless, guided by a particular code of conduct while in the
case of psychopaths there is a remarkable lack of a particular code of
conduct. In contrast the untrained offender (the third classification)
who was not taught to follow a particular code of conduct could be
regarded as a psychopath. Hare made a clear distinction between what
he calls, the true "psychopath" and those individuals who exhibit
anti-social conduct not because they are psychopathic but rather because
these individuals "have grown up in a delinquent sub-culture or in an
[91environment that fosters and rewards such behaviour" . In the 
second classification (reparative behaviour), Scott describes the 
psychopath's criminality as goal-motivated. But it is very difficult 
to assume that an individual who lacks a basic sense of any standard 
of morals or values and who does not follow any code of conduct is 
able to maintain an effort towards any far goal at all. As Cleckley 
has said:
".. On the contrary, he seems to go out of his way to make 
a failure of life. By some incomprehensible and untempting 
piece of folly or buffonery, he eventually cuts short any 
activity in which he is succeeding, no matter whether it 
is crime or honest endeavour " [10J.
Scott also suggested that the psychopath's criminality is aimed 
at compensating for feelings of inadequacy and inferiority which the 
environment has produced in him. But the individuals described in 
psychiatric literature as "psychopaths" are characterised by the inability 
to see themselves as others see them and as a result their criminality 
in unlikely to be directed towards compensating the feelings of inade­
quacy or inferiority which their environment has produced in them.
In the last classification (rigid fixations), Scott suggests 
that, in this category, learning has broken down and has been replaced
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[11]by a fixed, maladaptive pattern of response . But this is a very 
broad definition since the "fixed pattern of maladaptive response" 
can be caused by many different factors other than the disintegration 
of learning. For example such a pattern might be caused by epilepsy, 
childhood psychosis, brain damage and mental retardation.
Ability to make good impressions on others
Finally, in current literature the individuals labelled as
psychopathic personalities are often likeable, charming and have the
ability to make good impression on others. The assertion that the
psychopath is only guided by his instincts presupposes that he is
under no duty to abide any rule of conduct and therefore never feels
guilt, remorse or anxiety. This makes him free to promote his
abilities in many directions in order to exploit or manipulate
others in a very efficient manner . Halleck who considers the
psychopath as a freedom seeker (no matter whether this freedom is
[121moral or not), seems to support the assertion made by Wheelis that
"if a man can disentangle himself from involvement with others 
he is free to develop qualities in his own personality which 
are socially useful" [13]^
In search for the legitimacy of the psychopath's efforts to gain
his inhuman or immoral freedom, Halleck claims that this freedom
'is still a commodity so often lacking in the lives of most of us
that it is highly coveted' It is, at least in his opinion,
acceptable to the psychopath himself. But Halleck seems to follow
the same line of argument suggested earlier by Scott when the latter
classified those individuals trained to anti-social standards as 
[15]psychopaths . Following Scott's approach to the problem Halleck
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suggests that; "In some value systems, psychopathy can't be all bad"
Of course, the acceptability of social values and morals varies 
from place to place i.e. what is considered as morally sound in one 
society may not be so in another. This may be what made Smith conclude
ri7ithat: " we must not look for psychopathy everywhere!"
ETIOLOGY
The remainder of this chapter will be dedicated to the question 
of etiology. In trying to comprehend the causes of psychopathy certain 
factors regarded in literature as responsible for the existence of 
this disorder will be discussed. Many prominent psychiatrists seem 
to share the opinion that it is very difficult to trace a single 
cause sufficient to explain the origin of this disorder. There are, 
however, a number of possible explanations including heredity, patho­
logical and environmental factors.
Heredity
Heredity is the study of the transmission of physical and mental 
characteristics from one generation to another. Accordingly it has 
been suggested that heredity plays a part in the causation of psycho­
pathy. Curran, Partridge and Storey, who regard the etiology of 
psychopathy as a difficult and unsolved problem,suggest that the 
condition may develop through hereditary as well as the influence 
of upbringing. In their opinion the latter factor in certain cases 
may seem not to produce a good explanatory evidence at all 
Although these writers suggest strongly the hereditary basis for this 
condition, they do not produce evidence to support this assumption.
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However, many studies carried out on twins seem to favour the
hereditary basis for psychopathy. The double occurrence of psychopathy
was said to be higher in identical twins, whose genetic structure is
identical, than in fraternal twins who are no more alike than is usual
with members of the same family. Zax and Cowen (1972) mentioned two
ri9istudies on twins carried out by Lange (1930) and Rosanoff (1943)
In these two studies the incidence of shared psychopathy was higher 
in identical twins than in fraternal twins. But these studies were 
said to be lacking the good criteria for establishing the hereditary 
basis for psychopathy. Although it is a fact that identical twins 
are identical in their physical structure, they are not always identical 
in their psychological make-up. Studies on identical twins who had 
been reared apart from an early age and had grown up in different 
environments produced good evidence to exclude the hereditary factor 
in psychopathy. These studies emphasize environmental influences 
rather than hereditary factors. In the 1930's in America, the well- 
known studies conducted by Newman (on 19 pairs of identical twins who 
had been reared apart from an early age and had grown up in different 
environments) suggested that while the adult twins maintained a 
striking physical resemblance, the personalities of the pairs seemed 
in many cases to have moved apart. In one case Newman found that the 
first of the pair had been successful in his career, acquired good 
education and leading stable family life, while the second had been 
unfortunate and rather unsuccessful in both his family life and 
career. Similar findings were in general reached by Newman's inquiry.
Although most of the studies are conducted for the purpose of 
proving the influence of heredity as an explanation of psychopathy, the
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role played by environment is always noted. As Zax and Cowen 
explained; ". most of these studies failed to isolate the relative 
contributions of heredity and environment to the disorder"
Very recently, Eysenck emphasises the importance of heredity
by suggesting that a large number of psychopaths appear to belong to
[21]
what he called the hereditary circle . Although environmental 
factors are still the most crucial in determining the condition. 
Professor Eysenck speculates that psychopathic tendencies are geneti­
cally transmitted. But such a view ignores any reference to the 
person's interactions with others. In trying to prove the unreliability 
of the evidence based on studies performed on identical twins,
Eysenck suggests that if we agreed that identical twins are rare then
it will be more difficult to find identical twins who have been brought 
[22]
up in separation . In spite of this, Eysenck depends on one study
performed by Shields on four pairs of identical twins who had been
brought up separately and a similar number of pairs of identical twins
[23]who had been brought up together
Finally, most of the studies which tend to prove the influence 
of heredity are considered by many as unreliable and insufficient to 
establish a genetic causation of psychopathy. For example, Cleckley 
states that; "Even the famous studies of the Jukes and the Jonathan 
Edwards families have been severely criticized and called fallible by 
some" He went on to say; If an inborn biologic defect exists
and plays an important part in such a psychopath's disorder, it is not
[25]necessary to assume that the defect is hereditary" . This 
suggests clearly that the present state of knowledge and the available
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studies do not offer any good explanation as to how psychopathy is 
transmitted from generation to generation.
XYY Chromosome
Recent investigators have suggested that a certain number of 
psychopaths are the XYY chromosomal type. Like the old Lombrosian 
theory which propounds that criminality is determined by heredity, and 
that criminals could be distinguished from non-criminals by certain
r 261stigmatizing features . These investigators suggest that 
psychopaths could be distinguished from normal individuals by an 
abnormal chromosomal pattern (XYY). It should be mentioned, however, 
that the investigators have based their opinion on the ground that 
the XYY type is characterised by low intelligence, that he is often 
more than 6 feet in height and has a tendency to aggressive behaviour. 
Without going into too much detail there is not enough evidence to 
support this hypothesis. Hare, for example, rejected the idea when 
he stated:
"Whether the XYY complement is related to extremely aggressive 
forms of psychopathy (as opposed to other forms of criminal, 
anti-social behaviour) is as yet unknown. Even if it is, 
the relationship would not really provide evidence one way 
or the other on the role of hereditary factors in psychopathy, 
since the XYY complement is not inherited - it apparently 
reflects the failure of the sex chromosomes to separate 
properly during formation of the sperm " [27]^
Very recently Emery explained that:
".. the exact relationship of this chromosomal anomaly with 
either mental retardation or criminal tendencies is uncertain 
especially as XYY individuals have been found amongst the 
normal general population" [28]^
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Further, many psychiatrists , psychologists and others rejected 
[291
this hypothesis
BRAIN DAMAGE
It is a well known thesis that brain damage is associated with 
change in behaviour. Brain damage caused by accident, surgery or 
disease may cause the individual to behave in a totally abnormal manner. 
Certain diseases like meningitis and encephalitis are sometimes 
considered as responsible for producing or resulting in a social and 
psychopathic behaviour.
The electroencephalogram (EEG) which measures electrical activity 
of the brain is usually used for testing this hypothesis. The results 
of EEG studies were said to be unencouraging. For example, Fabisch 
states that; ".. any attempt at defining psychopathic states with the 
help of an EEG is bound to be somewhat limited"
In addition, these studies are used as a method of distinguishing 
the psychopath from the merely wicked. But the results are not 
sufficient to provide this distinction since, as many psychiatrists 
agree, the records of psychopaths with abnormal EEG's were no worse 
than the records of those without abnormalities. It is worth mentioning 
here that an abnormal EEG should not always be interpreted as something 
indicating the existence of physical defect in the brain. That is 
because several EEG studies showed that the slow wave activity (of the 
brain) found in adult psychopaths resembles that found, usually, in 
healthy children. This has led to the invention of the cortical 
immaturity hypothesis of psychopathy. Cortical immaturity in healthy 
children is not a sign of physical disease or injury to the brain. It
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is a characteristic of the brain in a developmental stage in childhood. 
As the child matures the slow wave activity of the brain is gradually 
replaced by faster wave activity. Therefore there is not enough 
evidence to support the thesis that abnormal electrical activity of 
the brain causes psychopathy (at least in children) . Smith pointed 
out that:
"..even should careful research turn up consistent substantial 
correlations between those earning the label psychopath on 
behavioural or attitudinal measures and EEG activity, it 
cannot be assumed that the brain activity is the cause of the 
behaviour or attitudes expressed" [31]^
Furthermore, EEG studies do not show whether there is a relationship 
between cortical immaturity and social immaturity i.e. whether 
psychopathic behaviour is a product of cortical immaturity. These 
studies also failed to explain what causes cortical immaturity in the 
adult psychopath. Is it, for example, due to a certain organic defect, 
inadequate socialization or related to a developmental delay. If we 
exclude the organic factor (because there is no evidence to support it) 
and the factor of delayed development (because the adult psychopath 
is not mentally retarded); There will remain only the factor of 
inadequate socialization. But is it responsible for bringing the 
condition of cortical immaturity found in adult psychopaths? If the 
answer is 'yes' then inadequate socialization in early life is 
responsible for causing social immaturity in adult life as well as 
cortical immaturation. That means the attainment of cortical and 
social maturation is a result of adequate socialization in early life. 
Again there is no evidence to support this assumption. But if we 
observe that:
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1) the slow-wave activity which appear in psychopaths appears 
naturally in children but not in adults.
2) the child reaches the adult pattern between sixteen and twenty 
years of age.
3) the slow-wave activity in psychopaths diminishes with age
4) the incidence of psychopathy decreases with age.
We will find that the time factor is very important in determining 
the attainment of cortical and social maturation in normal persons.
If therefore the slow-wave activity (which appears in adult psychopaths) 
diminishes with age and the incidence of psychopathy decreases also 
with age, then it is reasonable to say that the time factor is also 
responsible for determining cortical maturation as well as social 
maturation in psychopaths. It is important to note that the concept 
of time here is not used in a vaccum. Time comprises learning, 
instructing and upbringing and this is what actually makes the attain­
ment of social maturation possible. In addition the slow-wave activity 
which appears in psychopaths is not a sign of brain injury and does 
not reflect biological predisposition to certain attitudes. Its 
presence indicates, only, that psychopathy and immaturity are closely 
associated. For example, many characteristics of psychopaths (impulsi­
vity, aggressiveness, egocentricity, inability to delay gratification 
etc.)are found in children. In fact the psychopath's behaviour differs 
only quantitatively and not qualitatively from that of the child. It 
is interesting to mention here, that Dr W F Roper who analyses the 
relationship between delinquency and immaturity observes that:
42
If criminality and immaturity are so closely associated, 
may they not be much the same thing? We know that young 
children can be seen in any not too tidy nursery, assaulting 
each other, taking the belongings of others, and even 
engaging in sexual exploration, in a way which would be 
criminal in adults. No sensible person worries about these 
things because he knows that it is a normal phase of development 
which will disappear with training. May it not be that 
criminality is merely the persistence or reappearance of this 
nursery stage of development , which becomes ugly and dangerous 
simply because of the greater strength and sophistication of the 
adult?"[32]
By the same token we can say that psychopathy and immaturity
are closely associated and that the presence of the slow-wave activity
which appears in adult psychopaths is only evidence of this immaturity.
In other words, the psychopath is only a child grown up as a product
of unsuccessful domestication, inconsistency in learning and inadequate
socialization. To be more precise the presence of EEC abnormalities
(child pattern) found in adult psychopaths emphasizes the environmental
factors more than any other factors. As Hare has explained "The
cortical activity of psychopaths is probably the results of experiential
[ 33]and learning factors" . Hare based his opinion on research 
findings reported by Miller The contents of Miller's research
are explained by Hare in this way:
" In this research the brain wave-activity of rats was 
monitored, and whenever slow-wave activity was observed 
it was reinforced by direct electrical stimulation of 
rewarding areas in the brain. Other rats were reinforced 
for fast-wave activity. In each case the results indicated 
that the use of this instrumental learning technique could 
modify brain-wave activity; that is, either slow- or fast- 
wave activity could be learned. On the basis of these 
results, Miller suggested that it was possible that in the 
course of being rewarded for certain overt activities some 
people may learn a high level of arousal (that is, fast, low- 
voltage activity), while others may learn a low level of 
arousal (that is, slow, high voltage activity). In regard 
to psychopathy, it is conceivable that the parents of psycho­
paths have consistently rewarded behaviour that is associated 
with a low level of cortical arousal and that this is reflected 
in the slow-wave activity and cortical under arousal observed 
in psychopaths" [35]^
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To conclude this section, it should be noted that the child 
pattern of EEC, which is the abnormality found in psychopaths, is 
only abnormal because it is found in an adult individual. Therefore 
the question is one of delayed development rather than one of 
pathological nature. And this may be mainly due to inadequate sociali­
zation and inconsistency in learning.
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
As has already been noted, environmental factors may play the 
most crucial role in determining "psychopathy". By environment is 
meant the surrounding conditions and the circumstances of life of 
a persion, his family and his socitey.
The Formation of Conscience:
The family is regarded as the primary source of ethical values 
and social attitudes. Within its circle the child learns about right 
and wrong and how to adapt himself to the realities of the social 
environment. Psychologists, sociologists and even laymen agree that 
the role of the family, which is still the fundamental unit of most 
socieites, is very important in determining the future character of 
the child. The child is characterized by instinctive behaviour which 
requires immediate satisfaction. All human beings, like other creatures, 
are born with this disposition. Like a piece of clay the human infant 
can be shaped and moulded into a particular picture.
Society, in the form of parents and others, takes a full part in 
shaping the future character of the child. The instinctive attitudes 
need to be modified and postponed in order to meet the requirements of
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the family and, later, social life. If therefore the hedonistic 
tendency of the child is not modified and controlled by consistent 
learning and proper socialization, the result will be that the child 
will grow up like a wild animal without any code of conduct to follow,
The process of learning and upbringing results in the formation 
of conscience which, as has already been mentioned, is the representa­
tive of parental figures. Hare reported that:
"several studies have found that anti-social and delinquent 
behaviour are related to erratic and inconsistent disciplinary 
and socialization technique on behalf of the parents (Andry, 
1960, Bennet, 1960; McCord and McCord, 1964)" [36]^
It should be noted here that inconsistent socialization practices 
are not necessarily carried out by parents. They can be carried out 
also by parent substitutes or others. We cannot deny that there are 
many individuals who lost their parents in their early childhood and 
yet are not necessarily psychopaths. Also there are many psychopaths 
who came from respectable and well adjusted families. Cleckley who 
studied a considerable number of psychopaths who are probably from 
middle class families reported that:
"a very large percentage of psychopaths I have studied 
show backgrounds that appear conducive to happy development 
and excellent adjustment" [37]^
The implications of these observations may be that the well adjusted 
and non-psychopathic parent is not necessarily capable of or willing 
to give consistent learning or consistent discipline. Also the loss 
of parent or parents does not necessarily indicate that the consistent 
learning or socialization ceases to exist. The important thing about 
socialization is that it should always be there whether it is performed 
by parents or other people.
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Parents may be well adjusted and stable but still unwilling to 
make their child learn in a consistent manner. Parents may also be 
unstable, ignorant and unable to carry out a difficult task such as 
consistent learning and consistent discipline. This is also applicable 
to parents' substitutes. As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
consistent learning leads to the development of a particular code of 
conduct (the question whether this code is ethical or non-ethical 
is irrelevant here)
We sometimes describe people as having bad or good conscience, 
but this is not applicable in the case of the psychopath because one 
of his distinctive characteristics is that he had no conscience. This 
lack makes him incapable of having internal conflicts, although he 
often has conflicts with his external environment. Coleman in his 
valuable study of "Abnormal Psychology and Modern Life" describes 
such personalities as follows:
"Anti-social personalities are not classifiable as mentally 
retarded, neurotic, or psychotic. Their outstanding 
characteristics are a marked lack of ethical or moral 
development and an inability to follow approved models of 
behaviour. Basically they are unsocialized and incapable 
of significant loyalty to other persons, groups, or social 
values" [39]
No doubt this description is helpful in proving the lack of a basic 
sense of feeling right and wrong (in any sense) in the psychopath. 
According to Hare;
"..psychopaths appear to be deficient in only two components 
of morality, namely moral feelings and behaviour; there is 
little doubt that they know on a cognitive level, what 
society considérés to be right and wrong. However being 
deficient in the conditioning of emotional responses they 
are unable to experience moral feelings with sufficient 
intensity for awareness of the rules of society to be 
reflected in behaviour" [40]
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This, however, explains that in their early life, psychopaths did 
not receive a proper training which is necessary for the development 
of sufficient sense of feeling right and wrong, that is to say the 
development of conscience. Therefore the formation of conscience depends 
largely on providing consistent learning, affection, security, rewards 
and punishments. Also if the child who is immitative by nature does 
not have a consistent example to immitate,his self will remain difuse and 
inconsistent and consequently grow up without any basic sense of feeling 
right and wrong. According to Rees;
" consistency in all matters and relationships helps the 
child to form a stable attitude to life and enables 
him to develop standards and rules of behaviour which r..-• 
help him in reaching decisions and appropriate behaviour"
Obviously a consistent style of upbringing is necessary for the 
formation of conscience. Inconsistent behaviour on the part of the
parents prevents the child from establishing stable rules of conduct
and behaviour, with the result that a consistent self-concept does not 
develop. Under these circumstances the child may grow up with 
awareness (on a cognitive level) of what society consider s to be right 
and wrong but at the same time, he almost certainly does not know the
meaning of right and wrong at a feeling and emotional level. This results
in his rejection of any social restraints. He is disorganized, 
impulsive and anti-social. The only internalised principle controlling 
such persons is the achievement of self-gratification. This indicates 
clearly that there is a weak conscience which acts not only as a moral 
compass but also as an ethical director which is necessary for keeping 
the individual on the right direction.
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Briefly, as mentioned earlier the formation of conscience depends 
largely on the availability of eonsistent methods of upbringing and 
learning. This implies that early childhood experiences should not 
be ignored when we are discussing the origins of human conscience.
Aronfreed explains the origin of conscience in this way:
"The antecedents of conscience tend to be highly concentrated 
in the child's early relationships with a few socializing r.„-i 
agents, to whom it has very strong affective attachments"
This supports the assumption that early childhood experiences play a 
key role in the development of human conscience. This is true since 
it cannot be denied that children are basically modifiable and 
flexible organisms. According to this theory, the child is born 
with a capacity for knowledge. The realities he knows are the 
realities he experiences. It is worth mentioning here that the 
whole Scottish system of juvenile justice is based on this theory.
In their concluding observations, the members of the Scottish Committee 
on Children and Young Persons (under the Chairmanship of Lord 
Kilbrandon) which reported in 1964, pointed out that:
"From the earliest age of understanding every child finds 
himself part of a given family and a given environment - 
factors which are beyond his or society's power to control.
During childhood the child is subject to the influences of home 
and school. Where these have for whatever reason fallen 
short or failed, the precise means by which the special needs 
of this minority of children are brought to light are equally 
largely fortuitous. The individual need may at that stage differ 
in degree, but scarcely in essential character,and such children 
may be said at present to be, more than most, in a real and 
special sense 'hostages to fortune'. The time has come, we 
believe, when society may reasonably be expected so to organise 
its affairs as to reduce the arbitrary effects of what is still 
too often a haphazard detection process; and consequently to 
extend to this minority of children, within a sustained and 
continuing discipline of social education, the measures which 
their needs dictate, and of which they have hitherto been too 
often deprived" [43]
According to these observations the Kilbrandon Committee recommeded 
that the whole business of coping with children with problems would 
be fundamentally dealt with as an educational problem Needless
to say, by placing more emphasis on proper and consistent learning, 
many of the children whom we now stigmatize as psychopaths might be 
prevented from becoming delinquents at all. A continuing experience 
of inconsistent learning and unsound discipline will make the child, as 
growth takes place, unable to adopt any code of conduct or to develop 
a basic sense of feeling right and wrong. An example of this is 
children who experience many changes of background, live with different 
people in different places with repeated changes of school and 
repeated changes in the parents attitudes when providing love, protection 
and discipline. The life history of Charles Manson who murdered 
Sharon Tate and others in America in 1969 is a typical example of 
this faulty upbringing style. After tracing Manson's history in his 
study "Abnormal Psychology", Martin concluded that:
"In thinking back over the experimental and correlational 
literature on the internalization of social values, we can 
see several factors that might have contributed to Manson's 
psychopathic personality. His mother modelled a life of 
prostitution, irresponsibility, and crime. She probably 
provided little in the way of cognitive structuring about 
rules, consequences or values. It seems unlikely that she 
gave enough consistent love to provide an approach to child 
rearing that could even remotely be called love-oriented. In 
fact, Manson as a child was moved around so much that he t a sI 
probably experienced little consistent parenting by anyone"
Probably within this framework and with the contribution of other 
factors, psychopathy as we know it is a possible outcome.
In addition to past social learning experiences there are, 
subsequently, some socio-cultural factors which contribute to the
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development of this phenomenon which has been regarded by psychiatrists 
as indicative of mental illness. The children who grow up without a 
basic sense of moral obligation are likely to become anti-social in 
adulthood and repeatedly come into conflict with society's written and 
unwritten laws. No doubt persons with such qualities are expected to 
cheat, exploit and manipulate others when pursuing their own interests 
and they often appear not to know that their anti-social and inadequate 
conduct is in any sense wrong.
In this area of behavioural problems it becomes unnecessary to 
borrow words from medicine in order to explain or even to describe 
this social phenomenon. It is not a problem of "psychiatric disorders" 
but the reflection of inadequate socialization, lack of consistent 
love, discipline and inspired leadership.
In modern societies, where sometimes the end justifies the means, 
there is a great expectation that the seeds of anti-social behaviour 
will find more nourishment. If the goal is to make money, for 
example, then it is justifiable to use any means in order to achieve 
this goal without the slightest concern for the noxious side effects. 
The society itself breeds new possibilities of violating its laws.
In fact many features in the structure of modern societies work 
against true social health and lend encouragement to anti-social and 
criminal tendencies. Life in modern societies is characterized by 
hypocracy in the sense that the values existing are not respected or 
followed by the members of these societies. Halleck who describes 
the modern American society as "peculiarly characterized by inconsis­
tency, self deceit and paradoxical communication"  ^ explains
the matter in this way:
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" We can illustrate this point by listing only a few of the 
double messages that might be received by a lower-class negro 
boy growing up in a crowded urban area. He would be repeatedly 
exposed to inconsistent messages such as the following. On the 
left hand side are listed those ethical guidelines he would 
probably receive in church, in school and from his parents.
On the right hand side are listed those messages which he would 
learn from his experiences on the street or from observing the 
actual behaviour of his parents and other adults.
"Virtue is its own Reward"
"Love thy neighbour"
"Thou shalt not steal"
"Obey the law always"
"The meek shall inherit the earth" 
"All men are brothers"
"Thou shalt not covet thy 
neighbour's wife"
"Ask not what your country can 
do for you, ask what you can do 
for your country"
"You must learn to control, your 
sexual impulses"
"Everybody in America has the 
same opportunity"
"You can be happy without money"
"Don't be a fool, take what 
you can get"
"Don't involve yourself in 
other people's trouble"
"Some kind of stealing is all 
right, but just don't get caught" 
"Try to stay out of trouble, obey 
those laws that meet your needs" 
"You get what you fight for"
"We don't want those niggers 
moving into our neighbourhood" 
"Everybody has to cut loose 
once in a while, but don't let 
the "old lady" know"
"What do I owe this country?
Not a thing"
"You're not a man until you've 
had it. You're not a queer, 
are you?"
"Don't get too uppity, black boy"
"Nobody gets in without a 
ticket"
[47]
If such contradictory ethical standards are experienced by a young 
person, it may produce anger and readiness to choose crime as a career. 
Perhaps, Malcolm X, the black American who was a member of the 
criminal sub-culture represents a good example of a black child whose 
criminal development is largely due to the imposition of such contra­
dictory ethical standards. Martin explains Malcolm X's criminability 
by stating that:
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"Although individual psychological influences undoubtedly 
played some role in Malcolm X's criminal development, 
sociological circumstances seem to be the most important. If 
Malcolm X had not been born black, if his father had not 
presumably been killed by white racist, if he had not been 
discouraged from seeking an establishment career as a lawyer, 
and had not lived in the ghetto areas of Boston and New York, 
would he have become an habitual criminal? It seems unlikely, 
(Malcolm, X, 1966)" [48]^
It is not, however, far from the truth to say that the criminogenic 
social circumstances mentioned here are the natural outcome of the 
confusion we witness in today's world which can be attributed to the 
obvious disparity between the great advances made in science and 
technology and the backwardness in human behaviour and morals. In the 
above example of Malcolm X, the notion of black inferiority can easily 
be denied intellectually or even scientifically but is difficult to 
shake-off emotionally.
To sum up what has been said so far : it has been claimed that 
psychopathy is neither the outcome nor an aspect of mental illness 
but rather the product of earlier faulty upbringing accompanied later 
by other sociocultural factors which are the main source for nourish­
ment of anti-social behaviour. And if it is true that man does not 
alone fashion his life, then it is not unreasonable to conclude that 
psychopathy is the creation of others in the form of parents and the 
larger society. This may be what made a convicted psychopath like 
Charles Manson address his society in this was:
"Mr and Mrs America - you are wrong. I am not the king of 
the Jews nor am I a hippie cult leader. I am what you 
have made of me and the mad dog devil killer fiend 
leper is a reflection of your society.." [49]^
52
Notes
1. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-Mental Disorders, (2nd Ed,), 
Washington, D.C. : American Psychiatric Association, 1968.
2. Cleckley, H., The Mask of Sanity, (5th ed.)., St Louis, C.V.
Mosby Co., 1976, at p.346.
3. Rees, W.L., A Short Text Book of Psychiatry, (2nd ed.), London, 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1976, at p.24.
4. Zax, M., et. at. Abnormal Psychology ; Changing Conceptions,
New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1972, at p. 315.
5. Hare, R.D., Psychopathy : Theory and Research , London, John Wiley, 
1970, at p. 102.
6. Zax, et. al., op. cit., at p.103.
7. Cleckley, op. cit., at p. 348.
8. See Rees, op. cit., at p. 224.
9. See Hare, op. cit., at p. 8.
10. See Cleckley, op. cit., at p. 364.
11. Rees, op. cit.
12. Wheelis, A., The Seeker, New York, Random Houser, 1960.
Cited in Halleck, S.L., Psychiatry and The Dilemmas of Crime.
A study of Causes, Punishment and Treatment, London, University of 
California Press, 1971, at p. 107.
13. id.
14. ibid., at p. 108.
15. See Rees, op, cit.
16. Halleck, op. cit.
17. Smith, R.J., The Psychopath in Society, New York, Academic 
Press, Inc., 1978, at p. 20.
18. See Curran, D., et. al.. Psychological Medicine ; An Introduction 
to Psychiatry (7th ed.)., Edinburgh, Churchill Livingstone, 1972, 
at p. 154.
19. See Zax, M., et. al., op. cit., at p. 313.
20. id.
21. For further discussion see Eysenck, H.J., Crime and Personality, 
(Revised Ed.,), Paladin, 1977, at p. 57.
22. ibid., at p. 101.
23. Quoted by Eysenck, ibid., at p.p. 100-101.
24. Cleckley, op. cit., at p. 403.
25. ibid., at p. 412.
26. This theory was presented by the Italian Psychiatrist Cesar
Lombroso in 1876. The theory is now regarded as unproved. Eor
further discussion of this theory see for example, Halleck, op. cit, 
at pp. 12-13. Also, Taylor, Walton and Young, The New 
Criminology.
27. Hare, op. cit., at p. 72.
28. Emery, A.E.H., ’Genetic Factors in Disease’ in MacLeod, J., (ed.)., 
Davidson’s Principles and Practice of Medicine, (12th ed.)., 
Edinburgh, Churchill Livingstone, 1978, at pp. 10-12.
29. See particularly Rees, op. cit., at p. 261; see also Prins, H., 
Offenders, Deviants, or Patients?, An Introduction to the Study 
of Socio-Eorensic Problems, London, Tavistock, 1980, at p. 93.
53
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46
47
48
Fabisch, W., 'The Electroencephalograph' in Craft, M., (ed.)..
Psychopathic Disorders, Oxford, Pergamon, 1966, at p. 85.
Smith, R.J., op. cit., at p. 44.
Roper, W.E., 'A Survey of Wakefield Prison, 1948-49', Brit. J.
Deling. - 1 , 1950, pp 15-28.
See Hare, R.D., op. cit., at p. 71.
Quoted by Hare, op. cit., at p. 71. 
id.
ibid., at p. 97.
Cleckley, op. cit., at p. 410.
Eor more discussion see Rees, op. cit., at p. 27.
Coleman, J.C., Abnormal Psychology and Modern Life, (5th Ed.)., 
Glenview, Scott, Eoresman & Co., 1976, at p. 370.
Hare, op. cit., at p. 106.
Rees, op. cot., at p. 27.
Aronfreed, J., Conduct and Conscience : The Socialization of 
Internalized Control over Behaviour, New York, Academic Press,
Inc., 1968, at p. 12.
Report of the Committee on Children and Young Persons (Scotland), 
(Kilbrandon Report) Cmnd 2306/1964, Para. 251.
The Committee's proposals were translated into law by the Social 
Work (Scotland) Act of 1968.
Martin, B., Abnormal Psychology : Clinical and Scientific 
Perspectives, New York, Rinehart and Winston, 1977, at p. 488.
See also the Case of Patrick Mackay in Clark, T. and Penycate, J., 
Psychopath : The Case of Patrick Mackay, London, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1976, and the autobiography of Jimmy Boyle in his 
book, 'A Sense of Freedom'., Edinburgh, Canongate, 1977.
Halleck, op. cit., at pp. 122-23. 
id.
For details of Malcolm X's life history see Martin, op. cit., 
at p. 496.
49. ibid., at p. 488.
CHAPTER 3
THE PSYCHOPATHIC OFFENDER 
AND THE LAW
54
CHAPTER 3
THE PSYCHOPATHIC OFFENDER AND THE LAW
This chapter considers the legal position of psychopaths in both 
Scotland and England. The legal definition of the psychopath in the 
Mental Health Actof1959 and the Mental Health (Scotland)Act of 1960,
(as amended), will be commented on in order to see to what extent this 
definition coincides with psychiatric and other definitions of psycho­
pathy.
The question of the responsibility of psychopaths, which is complex 
and closely connected with social values and beliefs will also be discu­
ssed together with the evidence produced in a number of cases for 
establishing a scientific determination of the psychopath's responsibility
Introduction
Before discussing the legal position of psychopaths in both Scotland 
and England we need to highlight the major developments of the law 
relating to insanity and diminished responsibility with particular 
reference to the way in which these particular pleas may relate to the 
psychopathic offender.
All modern laws accept a person's abnormal mental condition as a 
ground for exempting him from conviction or punishment for an act 
prohibited by the law which he has committed.
In ancient times lunatics were not regarded as suffering from 
disease but were believed to be possessed by demons and were beaten, 
put in chains or sentenced to death by hanging or burning. Even if the
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alleged lunatic had committed some crime, there was no consideration 
of the offender's responsibility. However, rules to determine criminal 
responsibility were gradually formulated. One of the earliest tests 
of responsibility was that, for an accused to escape punishment - he 
must know what he is doing, no more than a wild beast. This requirement 
was altered and moderated when the terms right and wrong were substituted 
for "good and evil". The terms right and wrong were introduced in the 
famous English M'Naghten Rules (1843). According to the Rules, to 
qualify for immunity the accused must show that at the time the offence 
was committed he:
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease 
of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the 
act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not 
know he was doing what was wrong" [1].
It should be noted that the M'Naghten Rules are a test of 
responsibility in law for acts done. They do not relate to the matter 
or existence of insanity or any defined mental disorder. For this 
reason the case of the so-called psychopathic offender could not be 
brought within the Rules, The psychopathic offender knows the facts 
concerning the particular criminal act that he has committed, knows its 
harmfulness (quality) and its unlawfulness and consequences.
The Rules have been supplemented by the so-called irresistible 
impulse test. It applies to a person who knew the nature, quality and 
the wrongfulness of his act but has lost the ability to choose between 
right and wrong because he was suffering from mental disease or defect. 
The reason for introducing the irresistible impulse test which is often 
applied with M'Naghten, is that the medical profession has protested
* The Rules concentrate on cognitive ability i.e. if a man has a gun, does 
he know that it is a gun? Does he know that, if he discharges it, the 
effect may be damaging to other people? Thus the question "Does he Imow 
that it is wrong?" must be taken legalistically to mean "Does he know 
that it is wrong in law and punishable accordingly?"
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that under the Rules insanity is defined as a matter of law and so 
psychiatrists are forced to make judgements about a legal state rather 
than a behavioural state. Although the admissibility of the irresistible 
impulse (defence) depends on satisfying the requirement that, the 
accused by reason of mental disease or defect, has lost the ability to 
choose between right and wrong, psychiatrists failed, at least in the case 
of the psychopath, to satisfy this requirement.
The M'Naghten test which is adopted by most English-based legal
systems has been severely attacked not only by psychiatrists but also
by many eminent lawyers on the ground that the Rules provide only
cognitive criteria for determining the absence of sanity. For example,
the Scottish jurist G.H. Gordon has observed that the Rules: "are open
to the objection that they treat man as a purely cognitive being, and
[21ignore the volitional and emotional aspects of human nature"
In America where in many states, the Rules for a long time have 
been used in establishing legal insanity the medical profession protested 
that the Rules fail to take account of modern psychiatric knowledge. 
Psychiatrists argued that the determination of sanity should depend on 
whether the accused is suffering from mental illness or mental defect.
In 1954 in the case of Durham v. U.S.^^^ the Court of Appeal for 
the District of Columbia decided that: "an accused is not criminally 
responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or 
mental defect" The Durham Rule provided the opportunity for
psychiatrists to testify more completely and scientifically about 
their understanding of the motivational forces underlying the criminal 
act. But psychiatrists fail to go beyond presenting diagnostic labels
(a clear example is the case of the psychopath) which are not sufficient 
for explaining the origin of the disordered behaviour.
Because of this failure on the part of psychiatric witnesses the 
American Law Institute proposed a new alternative:
"A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the
time of such conduct as a result of mental disease......
he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law" [5]^
Needless to say this definition does not include cases where the 
abnormality is manifested only by criminal or otherwise anti-social 
conduct and therefore it clearly excludes from the concept of mental 
illness persons classified by psychiatrists as psychopaths. In 
addition it is questionable whether this definition differs substan­
tially from the M'Naghten formula. In this definition the phrase 
"to appreciate the criminality of his conduct" is capable of being' 
construed as referring to the cognitive ability of knowing right 
and wrong. As Gordon explains: "Appreciation is a wide enough term 
to cover all aspects of the conduct - its nature, its consequences, its 
moral value, and its legal effect"
Diminished Responsibility;
The notion of diminished responsibility was developed in ScotXsii through
case law. As maoy have sug^sted it whs by no -means peculiar to Scotland.
It was recognised by many other legal
systems in Europe, America and many other English-based legal systems 
in different parts of the world. The concept was introduced into 
English law by the Homicide Act of 1957. The reason for introducing 
it into English law is to avoid the rigidity of M'Naghten Rules as a
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test of responsibility. This is, however, by no means the position in 
Scotland where the M'Naghten formula is not the test of criminal 
responsibility.
It should be noted that diminished responsibility does not protect 
the accused from conviction. It only reduces the charge from murder 
to culpable homicide (in Scotland) and to manslaughter in England.
In practice, the doctrine is confined to murder cases and carries a 
much broader interpretation of insanity than the M'Naghten Rules. It 
covers cases where the accused knew the nature of his act and intended 
the consequences but nevertheless he is partially responsible. This 
departure from the Rules implies two things; first that the M'Naghten 
Rules are limited to cases of gross insanity and therefore incapable 
of dealing with borderline insanity cases; second, that the doctrine 
of diminished responsibility is devised for the purpose of making the 
law capable of keeping pace with modern psychiatric and psychological 
knowledge. This is, no doubt, a convincing argument but as far as 
psychopaths are concerned the present state of psychiatric or psycho­
logical knowledge is not in a strong position to prove that those 
individuals are mentally ill and the concept of psychopathy remains 
medically and legally meaningless.
The history of the concept of diminished responsibility shows 
that the concept was at first no more than the idea that if total 
insanity was a complete defence then partical insanity is a partial 
defence in that it would mitigate punishment. But a major change was 
introduced by a decision made in 1867 in the case of H.M. Adv. v. 
Dingwall where it was decided that: "Diminished responsibility
could reduce a charge of murder to one of culpable homicide"
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According to this decision, mental conditions not amounting to 
insanity may be accepted as a defence altering the category of the 
offence. The moral purpose behind this decision may be that it is 
necessary to distinguish legally between the bad and the mad. No doubt 
there may be mental conditions (not amounting to insanity) whose 
presence might lead the court to treat the accused as different from 
the normal person. But the distinction between the bad and the mad 
cannot be gained in the absence of proper criteria and accurate 
scientific evidence. In the absence of such evidence the courts will 
not allow those who are truly responsible to suceed in their defence of 
diminished responsibility.
At present the label 'psychopath' is of disputed medical validity 
and psychiatrists themselves are not agreed on the existence of such a 
condition. Under these circumstances the jury are expected to convict 
the accused of murder rather than the lesser charge. In Scotland the 
application of the doctrine is denied to psychopaths while it was 
accepted in England as a basis of diminised responsibility.
THE LAW OF SCOTLAND
In Scotland the Mental Health Act of 1960 avoided the actual use 
of the term "psychopathic disorder", but it recognizes by implication 
the condition as grounds for compulsory admission. This avoidance may 
suggest that the medical profession in Scotland does not directly 
recognize psychopathy as specific psychiatric condition. But it is 
not clear whether the medical profession in Scotland was opposed only 
to the use of the term "psychopathic disorder" - (which can be substituted 
by another) or to the recognition of the disorder itself as a distinct
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medical entity. If the opposition was declared - only - against 
the use of the term then we expect to find a substitute for that term 
in the Mental Health Act of 1960. And although section 23 of the Act 
avoids the direct use of the term by mentioning a certain "persistent 
disorder which is manifested only by abnormally aggressive or seriously 
irresponsible conduct" it still does not avoid the definitional uncer­
tainties associated with the concept in England and perhaps as Hogget 
has put it;
"..it makes them worse by insisting that the disorder must be 
manifested only by abnormally aggressive or seriously 
irresponsible conduct, thus reinforcing the claim that the 
diagnosis is wholly circular" [9],
The avoidance of the use of the term is therefore of no value since 
the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1960 recognizes the characteristics 
of the condition as grounds for compulsory admission and practically 
psychopaths are dealt with in much the same way as under the English 
Mental Health Act of 1959
However, as Gordon has explained, the Mental Health (Scotland) Act
1960, "... does recognise the psychopath as someone who is mentally ill,
F i l land as having a special place in the criminal law"
The Defence of Insanity in Scotland;
In Scotland the criteria for the defence of insanity appear to
be somewhat broader than the English M'Naghten Rules. The Directions
given in the case of H.M. Adv. v. Kidd by Lord Strachan to the jury were 
said to represent the current criteria for the defence of insanity in 
Scotlandi
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"In order to excuse a person from responsibility for his acts 
on the ground of insanity, there must have been an alienation 
of the reason in relation to the act committed. There must
have been some mental defect ....  by which his reason was
overpowered, and he was thereby rendered incapable of exerting 
his reason to control his conduct and reactions. If his 
reason was alienated in relation to the act committed, he was 
not responsible for that act, even although otherwise he may 
have been apparently quite rational" [12],
It has been suggested that this test is not far from M'Naghten Rules, 
since it also concentrates on cognitive ability. But the difference 
between this test and M'Naghten Rules is that the Scottish test accepts 
that a person may not have a sane understanding of what is happening 
even though he is aware of the nature of his act and its unlawfulness. 
Gordon describes the Scottish test as:
"consistent with the more general requirement of 'sane understanding' 
of which the Faculty of Advocates spoke in their evidence to the 
Royal Commission, and with Lord Moncreiff's view that mere 
'intellectual apprehension' is useless without a sane mind to 
apply one's knowledge" [13]^
Lord Strachan's approach in Kidd appears to be less stringent 
than the earlier approach suggested by Hume:
"an absolute alienation of reason ....  such a disease as
deprives the patient of the knowledge of the true aspect 
and position of things about him, - hinders him from 
distinguishing friend or foe.... and gives him up to the 
impulse of his own distempered fancy" [14]^
According to this approach the disorder must amount to an 
absolute alienation of reason if it is to serve the purpose of a 
defence in law. It does not specifically refer to the mental state 
of the accused in relation to the act committed and for this reason 
it requires a higher standard of 'alienation of reason' than that 
required by the Rule in Kidd .
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The M'Naghten Rules were followed in some of the earlier cases
f
[16]
[15lin Scotland . Gordon mentioned that Lord Hope in the case o
Jas Gibson declared the Rules to be part of the law of Scotland
In later cases (1869 to 1888) there was an obvious departure from the
Rules. This was mainly due to the attempts made by Lord Moncreiff
who stressed in a number of cases that the accused is irresponsible
[171if his unlawful acts are the product of mental disease
These different approaches may suggest that there was no 
specific test for dealing with insanity cases in Scotland and thatjudges 
were free to adopt a more liberal approach than that allowed by the 
M'Naghten Formula.
However, as it has been mentioned, the Rule in Kidd is seen as 
representing the current position in Scotland. This Rule comes closer 
to the proposals made by the American Law Institute which, as we have 
seen, clearly excludes the psychopath. In Scotland there is no legal 
authority that psychopathy was accepted by the courts as a basis of 
the defence of insanity. It is also unlikely that the Thomson Committee's 
suggested defence "Absence of legal responsibility due to mental 
disorder" could include the psychopath, since there is no
evidence that psychopaths are mentally disordered. Further, the Scots 
have rejected even the application of diminished responsibility to the 
psychopath.
Irresistible Impulse :
Is a test applied to a person who knew the nature and quality of 
his act and its unlawfulness, but by reason of some mental disease or
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defect he had lost the power to control his actions. The doctrine 
of irresistible impulse (unlike the M'Naghten Rules) clearly 
considers the volitional aspect in human actions. In Scotland the 
doctrine is likely to be accepted since the Rule in Kidd (which 
represents the current position in Scotland) focuses not only on the 
accused's thinking on reasoning but also on what is called a "volitional 
defect",
"..There must have been some mental defect, by which his reason 
is overpowered, and he was thereby rendered incapable of r^ g-i 
exerting his reason to control his conduct and reactions"
The irresistible impulse test has its own difficulty in that the 
mental defect which led to the commission of the uncontrolable act may 
be confused with other states of hatred, revenge or passion growing 
out of anger. However, according to the directions made by Lord 
Cooper in Braithwaite (1945), the person is accountable if his
act is induced by any of these causes i.e. hatred, revenge etc. Also it 
may be difficult for expert witnesses (at least in the case of the 
psychopath) not to confuse such mental defect or disease with these 
states. But if the medical evidence is sufficient to prove that the 
criminal act was the product of mental defect, the courts are likely 
to accept the defence on this basis.
Gordon who disagrees with the generalizations made by Lady 
[211
Wootton on the subject, seems to support this view. He says:
"..while this might be true in the context of the psychopathic 
gangster there are some cases where we are prepared to 
treat the offender as lacking free will" [22],
Needless to say, offenders treated "as lacking free will" are either 
suffering from mental disease or defect, or acting under compulsion or 
coercion while the evidence would suggest that psychopaths are not.
64
Diminished Responsibility:
As mentioned earlier the plea of diminished responsibility 
originated in Scotland and is a part of the Common Law (in England it 
was introduced by statute). It should be noted that the liberal 
approach followed by the Scottish judges in dealing with insanity cases 
is also followed in cases of diminished responsibility and the inter­
pretation of the doctrine is left wholly to the judges.
r 1
In the case of Alex Dingwall (1867) Lord Deas who is
regarded as the founder of the doctrine (in its modern form) appears to 
be accepting not only the mental state of the accused as sufficient 
for reducing the charge from murder to culpable homicide, but also 
factors such as volitional weakness induced by sudden loss of temper 
and the unpremeditated nature of the criminal act itself. In that 
case the accused quarelled with his wife and killed her because she had 
hidden his liquor and his money. Lord Deas stated the grounds justifying 
the reduction of the charge from murder to culpable homicide:
"1st, The unpremeditated and sudden nature of the attack; 
The prisoner's habitual kindness to his wife, of which 
there could be no doubt, when drink did not interfere; 
3rd, There was only one stab or blow, this, while not 
perhaps like what an insane man would have done, was 
favourable for the prisoner in other respect;...." [24]
Gordon pointed that Lord Deas in later cases "referred to all the
mitigating factors, and not only to the accused mental state, as the
[251reason for the reduction of the crime to culpable homicide"
Lord Deas's approach suggest clearly that the doctrine is based 
on general humanitarian grounds in that it gives consideration to the
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accused's mental state as well as to other mitigating factors.
If we compare this with the English approach we find that the 
English approach make the doctrine incapable of interpretation except 
within the stated limits in the Homicide Act while Lord Deas 
approach allows the doctrine to operate in a non-restrictive way. The
Scottish approach has also its own difficulty when it views diminished 
responsibility as something affecting responsibility rather than punish­
ment. For example, the responsibility of the accused cannot be properly 
assessed in cases (like psychopathy) where the alleged mental abnormality 
is incapable of scientific proof. The courts cannot accept vague or 
conflicting medical evidence without deliberately ignoring the 
traditional criteria of criminal responsibility. In the case of
r 261Francis Gove Lord Deas himself seems to treat diminished respon­
sibility as something affecting punishability rather than responsibility 
when he accepted the accused's mental weakness as sufficient justification
for the reduction of punishment:
"There might be men of habits of mind who should not be 
punished with the Capital Sentence of death, as they would 
have been in full possession of their faculties...." L27J^
It may be possible that this definition could include psychopathy 
(in a non-psychiatric sense) since "men of habits of mind" are not 
necessarily or by definition suffering from mental disease. Lord 
Deas' observations suggest that character defect could be considered 
by the law as an excuse leads to reduction of punishment. Thus 
diminished responsibility, according to these observations, is not 
viewed as a defence per se but rather as a means empowering the court 
to reduce punishment if it decided to consider such excuse i.e. 
character defects.
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However, the Scottish Courts, appear to be much more cautious in 
admitting "defects of character" as excluding responsibility. They 
may treat those cases as deserving leniency or mitigation of punishment 
after conviction has been established. There are many cases in 
Scotland in which diminished responsibility was directed towards 
mitigation of sentence
Diminished Responsibility and Psychopaths in Scotland:
Unlike the English Courts the Scottish Courts rejected the 
application of the doctrine of diminished responsibility to psychopaths, 
One reason for this may be that, although one purpose of the doctrine 
may be to make the law regarding insanity capable of keeping pace with 
scientific developments it is still feared by the Scottish Courts 
that diminished responsibility may be abused or given wider interpre­
tation. In fact the defence of diminished responsibility has been 
introduced in a variety of ways e.g. lack of control, jealousy, drug 
taking, bad temper, provocation and mercy killing can be offered as 
evidence of diminished responsibility.
In H.M.A. V. Braithwaite (1945), Lord Justice - Clerk (Cooper) 
directed that:
"...it will not suffice in law for the purpose of this defence 
of diminished responsibility merely to show that an accused 
person has a very short temper, or is unusually excitable 
and lacking in self control. The world would be a very 
convenient place for criminals and a very dangerous place 
for other people if that were the law" L29]^
This attitude of the Scottish judges is justifiable not only 
because there is a possibility of the doctrine being abused or given 
a wider interpretation, if it includes these categories, but also
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because this attitude stands firm against those who claim that there 
are no ordinary criminals who break the law voluntarily and responsibly 
and that all criminals are sick in such a way as to diminish their 
responsibility. But this view is unacceptable because it will result 
in a disregard of public security. The increased availability of the 
diagnosis of sickness will encourage those who are criminally motivated 
to violate the law in order to satisfy their own desires. They 
expect their conduct to be explained in terms of mental illness, since 
psychiatrists are willing to define them as sick rather than bad.
Habitual criminals may malinger when they fail to escape the consequences 
of anti-social deeds. The community would be a comfortable home for 
the games that habitual criminals play. Some may argue that by calling 
them sick the society attempts to humanize its treatment of criminals.
But there are many ways of helping criminals without calling them sick.
Furthermore the judge will no doubt be sceptical about the 
genuiness of the defence if one of the above categories is introduced 
as evidence of diminished responsibility. The only step he can take 
in order to avoid this dilemma is to explain fully to the jury the 
scope and effect of the doctrine. But this will be a very difficult 
task for both the judge and the jury members who are laymen and not 
competent to understand genuinely a legal explanation full of 
technicalities. It should also be noted that in ptractice the doctrine of 
diminished responsibility applies only in murder cases, and so it would 
in any event not be any help if the psychopath is charged with 
different offence.
The idea of diminished responsibility was explained by Gordon 
in this way:
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"It... seems to have started in practice with an understanding 
that certain cases of mental weakness should be dealt with by 
way of a conviction accompanied by a recommendation to 
mercy" [30]^
That means the doctrine operates only after conviction has been
established and therefore affects only the amount of punishment or the
type of disposal. Maher concluded that: "..."diminished responsibility"
was one of the factors considered by the judge in using his discretion
r 311in determining the sentence for a convicted person"
In the light of this understanding and in trying to apply the 
doctrine to psychopaths, diminished responsibility should not be 
considered as a defence per se but rather as a mitigatory factor which 
is capable only of deciding the amount of punishment (at the discretion 
of the court) or imposing the proper method of disposal. In this way 
courts can avoid the unnecessary widening of the concept of diminished 
responsibility and at the same time find a solution for the question 
of the responsibility of the "non sane - non insane category which is 
admittedly difficult to tackle. The difficulty therefore arises when 
we consider diminished responsibility as the decisive factor in 
assessing responsibility rather than sentence or disposal. And if the 
categories of diminished responsibility are wide and difficult to 
define, then the discretionary power of the judge will allow him to 
treat every case according to its merits. This of course will be of 
great assistance especially in dealing with certain types of cases 
which are difficult to define with any precision.
In Scotland the most important case on "psychopathy" was the case
[32l
of Patrick Carraher in which the decision was said to have put an
69
end to the development of the doctrine of diminished responsibility, 
in general, and in particular denied the application of the doctrine 
to psychopaths
The Case of Patrick Carraher (1946):
The accused killed a man by stabbing him on the neck. He was 
charged with murder and tried. In the course of his trial the defence 
produced evidence that the accused was in a state of intoxication at 
the time. The defence also produced evidence that the accused had a 
"psychopathic personality". He was convicted. The Counsel for the 
Defence presented an application for leave to appeal against conviction
The main reasons for appeal were that the trial court failed to 
consider how the combination of drink and psychopathic personality 
might diminish responsibility. The inference to be drawn from this, 
is that, psychopathy if not combined with drink, will not amount to an 
evidence of diminished responsibility. The appeal was refused and 
Lord-Justice-General (Normand) gave the opinion of the High Court
"The learned judge felt, as he says, difficulty about remitting 
this evidence for consideration to the jury as a ground for 
reducing the charge from one of murder to one of culpable 
homicide. I also have grave doubt whether it was evidence of 
any thing approaching to mental disease, aberration or great 
peculiarity of mind, and whether the judge might not have been 
warranted in withdrawing the issue from the jury. The court 
has a duty to see that trial by judge and jury according 
to law is not subordinated to medical theories; and in this 
instance much of the evidence given by the medical witnesses is, 
to my mind, descriptive rather of a typical criminal than of a 
person of the quality of one whom the law has hitherto regarded 
as being possessed of diminished responsibility" [35]^
The decision in Carraher indicates clearly that psychopaths should not 
be regarded as of diminished responsibility and that criminal behaviour
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should not be equated with abnormality of the mind since there are 
many people who are plainly evil.
Furthermore there is no approved medical criterion for distingui­
shing psychopaths from habitual criminals
The Scottish jurist G.H. Gordon who studied the case of Carraher 
put his views on the question of the responsibility of the psychopaths 
in this way:
"One fundamental difficulty in accepting psychopathic 
personality as an abnormal state is that it appears to be 
a personality defect, or at most a form of emotional 
instability, so that the psychopath's "excuse" seems to be 
his own character, and the acceptance of such an excuse 
conflicts with ordinary ideas of moral responsibility and free 
will" [37]
No doubt the problem of "psychopaths" and the idea of diminished 
responsibility pose many philosophical, moral and legal questions.
Apart from the legal contexture of the phrase "diminished responsibility", 
it is not clear what is meant by diminished responsibility. The word 
responsibility may mean here : accountability, culability or the degree 
of blameworthiness as well as liability to punishment. If, for 
example, we take "responsibility" here as meaning the degree of balme- 
worthiness, this may lead us to think that the concept of diminished 
responsibility will apply here as a defence. On the other hand if we 
understand "responsibility" in the sense of liability to punishment 
then it will apply here as an excuse (in a literal sense). Gordon 
in his above statement explained no difference between excuses and 
defences when he pointed that, the psychopath's excuse (his character) 
"conflicts with ordinary ideas of moral responsibility and free will".
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The use of the phrase "moral responsibility" in Gordon's statement 
implies that if an excuse was not accepted the accused will be fully 
responsible, but if it was accepted the accused will only be partially 
responsible. In this way diminished responsibility is considered as 
something affecting the question of guilt rather than punishment or 
disposal and for this reason it (principally) provides for removing 
the offence into a separate category which carries a lower maximum 
penalty. This indicates that diminished responsibility affects the 
question of quilt, in that it reduces the charge from murder to 
culpable homicide, as well as affecting the penalty by giving the 
punishment prescribed for the charge of culpable homicide or by 
imposing a proper method of treatment and disposal. But a proper and a 
suitable method of disposal or treatment cannot be reached if we under­
stand diminished responsibility (in the first place) as something 
affecting the responsibility rather than the punishability of the 
accused. In this sense diminished responsibility concentrates on the 
offender's state of mind at the time of the single act committed and 
consequently attached less weight to his state of mind at the time of 
disposal which is more relevant when deciding methods of treatment or 
disposal. What the accused did in the past may not be a relevant or 
a sufficient guidance for the court when imposing suitable methods 
of future care and treatment. The combined effect of diminished 
responsibility i.e. the fact that it affects both responsibility and 
punishment causes great difficulty especially in cases where the 
(defence) of psychopathic personality is adduced as evidence of 
diminished responsibility. In order to escape this difficulty the 
distinction between defences and excuses will remain necessary. If
therefore we suppose that the result of an accepted excuse will be the 
reduction of punishment (mitigation), then an excuse will be an answer 
to the claim that someone should be punished. On the other hand if we 
suppose that the result of an accepted defence will be the elimination 
or the diminishing of the responsibility of the accused, then a 
defence will be an answer to the claim that someone should be convicted.
But the difficulty with the latter approach is that, it is not possible 
in all cases to reduce the offence to the lower category. An example 
of this are cases of theft where the only other alternative is to 
reduce the sentence.
The former approach i.e. an excuse is an answer to the claim that 
someone should be punished, suggests that the plea of diminished 
responsibility affects, only, the liability to punishment after 
conviction has been established. In this way diminished responsibility 
can more easily be explained to the members of the jury who are laymen 
and competent only to decide on questions of facts not on questions of 
law. The mitigation of the severity of punishment where there is a 
clear evidence of the presence of mitigating circumstances, is, no
doubt, a question of fact. In this way the meaning and the scope of
diminished responsibility can be explained easily to the members of the 
jury. In addition, and as far as psychopaths are concerned, diminished 
responsibility should not be interpreted in terms of mental incapacity 
for this causes great difficulty for the members of the jury who are 
also not competent to understand psychological or philosophical notions 
such as mental abnormality or emotional instability.*
Finally the decision in Carraher stands not only against the
If it is true that the doctrine of dinished responsibility is ultimately 
based on general humanitarian grounds and that it exists because the law 
shows a tenderness towards the frailty of human nature, then (on this ground)
it can easily be explained to the members of the jury.
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application of the doctrine to psychopaths but also against any 
wider interpretation of the doctrine itself. This reveals the fact 
that if diminished responsibility is to be regarded as a defence 
rather than an "excuse" or a plea in mitigation, then the result 
may be an unnecessary widening to the concept itself. In the words 
of J.L.L.J. Edwards, the case of Carraher,
"...indicates clearly a fear on the part of the Scottish 
Court of Criminal Appeal that the concept of diminished 
responsibility was in danger of becoming an unruly horse 
and that the time had come to apply the brake" [38]^
On the other hand it appears that the rejection of the application of 
the doctrine to psychopaths in Scotland is mainly based (particularly 
in Carraher) on the fact that the medical evidence is insufficient to 
prove that the condition falls within the ambit of diminished 
responsibility. The inference to be drawn from this is that psychopaths 
may fall within the ambit of diminished responsibility if there is 
a sufficient medical evidence. But we have already noticed how the 
medical model have failed "psychopaths" who are presenting - in the 
first place - a behavioural problem. In the present circumstances the 
problem of dealing with these individuals can be solved by regarding 
the psychopath's "excuse" (i.e. his character) as a mitigating 
circumstance, the effect of which will be not only the reduction of 
sentence where punishment is effective, but also the provision for 
alternative methods of treatment because some of those individuals 
are unable to learn or benefit from punishment. An example of these 
alternative methods may be, reformatory institutions, or community 
homes (with educational and training facilities).
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The Law of England;
Psychopathic states are defined by the Mental Health Act of 
1959 as:
"Persistent disorders or disability of mind (whether or not 
including subnormality of intelligence) which result in 
abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct 
on the part of the patients, and require or are suscceptible 
to medical treatment-" (5.4(4)).
This definition indicates that the abnormally aggressive or the 
seriously irresponsible conduct of psychopaths is an outcome of a 
disability of the mind. The phrase "disability of mind" indicates a 
disability (from whatever cause) which can produce irresponsible 
and serious anti-social conduct. Therefore the above subsection makes 
it very difficult to distinguish the psychopath from the imbecile, the 
idiot, the feeble minded or the moral defective who is also aggressive 
or irresponsible. As a result the term "disability of the mind" 
may mean any departure from the normal standards of mental health and 
therefore is incapable of exact definition, and may be used in more 
than one sense.
In Parliament during the discussions of the Mental Health Bill
the definition was attacked and many thought that it might be better
not to define psychopathic disorder. Many remained sceptical ( though
they are doctors) and finally accepted the proposed definition solely
in the hope that the Bill would stimulate the Medical Research Council
to action because, as suggested by Dr. Summerskill: "there is an
[391urgent need for research in this field" . Dr Summerskill's 
remarks clearly suggest that the medical profession in England is not
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yet in a position to decide whether or not psychopathy is a mental 
illness. Further Dr Summerskill's own opinion on the matter seems to 
support the thesis that psychopathic disorder lies outside the field 
of medicine. He argued:
"The diagnostic criteria is a social one, and the fault 
may be more with society than with the patient's 
inheritance or with his genes" [40]^
Needless to say, this argument totally exludes the possibility that 
psychopathy is an outcome of heredity or constitutional factors. In 
spite of that. Dr. Summerskill was not against the definition 
suggested by the Bill. He gave another justification for accepting 
the definition. He said " it is doubtful whether one could find an 
alternative to satisfy everyone" However, in any event, this
will not be sufficient to encourage the acceptance of a definition of
mental illness. In these circumstances the only way out may be to 
decide the matter by way of voting and again this is not a scientific 
or a proper criteria for defining mental illness.
Another member (Mr. Walker-Smith) suggest that the definition 
"approximates closely to the general understanding of the term"
But the general understanding of the term is no more than a layman's 
view (i.e. the man who committed this horrible crime must by a
psychopath) and could not justify a detention of a sane criminal in a
mental hospital on the ground of mental illness.
As far as the question of treatability of psychopaths is concerned, 
many members (mainly doctors) appear to be pessimistic about the matter. 
For example. Dr. Reginald Bennet who had a considerable experience in
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treating psychopaths, confirmed this pessimistic attitude:
"I think that without any hesitation we can say the 
psychopath is almost entirely unsuitable for hospital 
treatment. The other trouble is that I very much doubt 
whether anyone would be likely to confirm with any 
confidence that he is in any way susceptible to medical 
treatment" [43]
Obviously Dr. Bennet's remarks suggest that the proposed definition can 
lead to nothing but unproductive labelling.
Early in the nineteenth century the term "moral insanity" was 
introduced to describe those who are now classified as psychopaths 
The term "moral insanity" means different things to different 
writers. To some writers moral insanity is regarded as something of 
emotional and psychological nature rather than of ethical or moral 
nature. Michael Craft reported that Prichard (1835):
"...first uses the term "moral insanity"throughout his 
treatise to describe those patients with insanity whose 
emotional and affective faculties are disordered" [45]
The definition of psychopathy in the 1959 Act is close to this 
description of moral insanity and causes a similar definitional problem 
because both definitions are capable of comprising a mixture of 
several disorders. In fact the same definitional problems are seen in 
the old definitions of psychopathy. For example, under the Mental 
Deficiency Act of 1913, the category of moral defective was reserved 
for cases of serious behavioural disorder. Moral defectives were 
defined as:
"persons in whose case there exists mental defectiveness 
coupled with strongly vicious or criminal propensities and 
who require care, supervision and control for the protection 
of others" [46]
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After the 1913 Act, the Amending Act of 1927 was passed which 
replaced the term "moral imbecile" by the term "moral defective". But 
the important change introduced by the Amending Act of 1927 is that 
a defect of intelligence or understanding is not necessary for 
creating the condition. Professor Glanville Williams suggests that :
" The change of terminology in the Act of 1927 was intended 
to show that there need be no defect of understanding" [47]^
The definition of psychopaths found in the 1959 Act resembles that 
of moral defective found in the Mental Deficiency Acts of 1913 and 1927, 
since the 1959 Act defines psychopathy as "a disability of mind 
(whether or not including subnormality of intelligence) which result 
in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct" and 
require or is susceptible to medical treatment. It is very difficult 
to reject this similarity between the two definitions because there 
seems no clear difference between the term "mental defectiveness" which 
appears in section one of the 1927 Act and the term "diability of 
mind" which appears in the 1959 Act. There is actually no difference 
since the word "mental" is synonymous with the word "mind" and the 
word "defectiveness" may be synonymous with the word "disability".
If therefore the terms "mental defectiveness" and "disability of 
mind" have virtually the same meaning, then there is no clear advance 
mady by replacing the term "moral imbecile" (which appears in the Act 
of 1913) by the term "psychopathic disorder" which appears in the Mental 
Health Act of 1959. Further, the Mental Deficiency Acts of 1913 and 
1927 and the Mental Health Act of 1959, suggest that the condition 
results in abnormal and criminal behaviour which requires care and
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treatment. The only difference is that the 1959 Act stressed that 
treatment should be of medical nature while the Mental Deficiency Acts 
speak (in general) of care, supervision and control. But this can 
also be interpreted as of medical nature as well as any other sort of 
treatment. In practice, however, the psychopath is now dealt with 
punitively rather than medically.
In the years of 1954-57 a Royal Commission on the law relating to 
Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency ^^^^came to the conclusion that 
it is very difficult to classify someone as moral imbecile unless he 
is characterised by some weakness of intelligence or understanding and 
his behaviour is accompanied by some limitation of intelligence. For 
those who are characterised by aggressive and inadequate dispositions 
which do not amount to severe sub-normality, the diagnosis of 
psychopathic personality is reserved and medically recognized as a 
pathological condition and if their behaviour is accompanied by some 
limitation of intelligence the person should be called a "feeble minded 
psychopath".
This definition includes persons whose intelligence is not 
markedly limited as well as those persons whose intelligence is 
markedly limited. Like the Commission's definition, the 1959 Act's 
definition includes both categories and of course recognizes the 
condition - medically - as of a pathological nature. That means the 
diagnosis of psychopathy covers both mental illness and sub-normality. 
This is similar to the old definition of "moral imbecility" or "moral 
defectiveness". As Lady Wootton has put it:
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"Moral defective is an excellent shorthand description of 
the psychopathic type of personality" [49]^
Hoggett who reviewed the legal history of the definition of
psychopathy expressed her views about the definition of psychopathy in 
the 1959 Act in this way:
"The resulting statutory definition of psychopathy ....
..emphasized still further the connection with serious 
anti-social behaviour, and it is questionable how far it 
departed from the old idea of moral imbecility" [51]^
The Mental Health Act of 1959 describes the condition as
requiring or being susceptible to medical treatment. But most
psychiatrists agree that few psychopaths respond to medical treatment
and in practice few hospitals agree to admit psychopathic patients
who are admittedly untreatable and difficult to handle. In 1972 the
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Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders was set up to review
the provisions of the criminal law relating to mentally abnormal 
offenders and the facilities for the treatment of such persons. The 
Report of the Committee suggests that:
"Psychopaths are not in general treatable at least in 
medical terms" [33J
As far as the treatability of psychopaths is concerned, this statement 
corresponds with the present state of medical knowledge. In addition, 
the inaccuracy of the diagnosis renders the question of the treatment 
of psychopaths very difficult if not an impossibility. In spite of the 
fact that the Report of the Butler Committee is quite confident on this 
matter, some writers have attacked the Committee's recommendations 
on the ground that the Committee made its recommendations on the basis
tsu
of studies made principally in institutions for recidivists. For 
example, Scott makes the point that:
"To draw conclusions about the treatability of psychopaths 
from the comparison of two such institutions (Hersted Vester 
and Horsens, or Grendon and Wormwood Scrubs) is not really 
relevant to their conclusion since all four institutions 
are for recidivist criminals. If the Committee had studied 
Schizophrenia in the chronic wards of mental hospitals it 
would no doubt have concluded that Schizophrenia is in 
general incurable, which is not true" [54]^
As far as the treatability of "psychopaths" is concerned, this 
argument seems to ignore the fact that in many cases psychiatrists lock 
up people as mentally ill only on the basis of anti-social behaviour 
and offer only custodial rather than therapeutic measures.
The so-called psychopath is only a diagnostic label and is not 
in itself sufficient to prove the availability of treatment or to show 
that there is a difference between therapeutic and custodial measures.
Furthermore the Butler Committee concluded that the concept of 
psychopathic disorder was no longer useful or meaningful and recommended 
that "responsibility for dealing with dangerous psychopaths should be 
clearly placed on the prison ratherthanhospital services" This
recommendation was probably reached after realizing that psychopaths 
are not welcomed by most hospitals, and even if they are admitted, the 
hospital services will remain primarily custodial in nature. This 
rejection on the part of hospitals reflects their belief that psycho­
paths are untreatable by medical measures and leadsthe patient himself 
to believe that he is incurable even if there is a possibility of 
benefiting from medical treatment. In these circumstances, the prison 
will be the best or perhaps the only alternative. Prisons are provided
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with training and educational facilities which as the Committee suggests, 
are superior to those found in many hospitals The Report of
the Committee goes some way towards meeting this point by recommending 
that:
"no hospital order shall be made by the courts in the case of 
an offender suffering from psychopathic disorder with 
dangerous anti-social tendencies, unless the court is 
satisfied ;
(a) that a previous mental or organic illness, or an 
identifiable psychological or physical defect, relevant 
to the disoreder is known or suspected; and
(b) there is an expectation of therapeutic benefit from 
hospital admission" [57]^
We have already seen that it is difficult in the present state of 
medical knowledge to satisfy the two conditions (a) and (b). And it 
is obvious that in the absence of medical or scientific explanation of 
the psychopath's criminality, the members of the Committee felt that 
the condition does not represent some pathological abnormality which is 
capable of specific diagnosis or treatment. They describe the 
definition of psychopathy (as appears in the 1959 Act) as carrying no 
implication that psychopathy is a single entity, and say:
"The statutory definition of psychopathic disorder includes 
not only the abnormally aggressive person but also 
under the criterion of serious irresponsibility, such a 
person as the compulsive gambler" [58]
Many witnesses to the Committee expressed the view that the concept
of psychopathy is no more than "a part of the general attempt of
secular society to replace moral explanations of behaviour by medico-
[59]scientific explanations" . It is therefore not far from the truth 
to say that the Committee sees the diagnosis as no more than a label
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reflecting the view that psychopaths are a social menace or social 
nuisance and it is for this reason that they suggest that the more 
suitable place for the psychopath will be the prison.
Their recommendations are not merely designed to protect hospitals - 
as many have suggested - but rather to protect the patient's interest 
as well as the interest of society by making the prison a more suitable 
place for the training, resocializing and the rehabilitating of those 
unfortunate individuals. And if the hospital services now are, 
admittedly, of custodial nature, then a properly equipped and humane 
prison will be the more suitable place. Consequently in these circum­
stances, the compulsory hospitalization of psychopaths seems to be 
irrelevant and ineffective. Therefore the arrangement for psychopaths 
in section 60 of the 1959 Act - which empowers the courts to impose 
a hospital order instead of a penal disposal - should not be interpreted 
as a mere licence for compulsory detention. However, one can also say 
that the Butler Committee members wished to leave the door open for 
later knowledge to find a medical explanation of psychopathy when they 
suggest that:
"no hospital order shall be made unless the courts are 
satisfied (medically) that the offender is suffering from 
mental disorder and that there is a possibility of benefiting 
from medical treatment" [80]^
This is a moderate and realistic approach to the problem because 
it satisfies both those who are looking for or expecting a possible 
scientific explanation of the problem in the future, and those who 
favour a social explanation to the problem and consequently prefer that 
the penal system deals with the question of caring, re-educating and 
controlling those individuals.
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In Britain now there is continuing uncertainty about the treat­
ability - in medical terms - of those individuals classified as 
psychopaths. Many psychiatrists who testified to the Butler Committee 
were of the opinion that there is, at present, no recognised effective 
medical treatment for such condition. The British Psychological Society 
reported that there is no solid evidence of the effectiveness of 
treatment for psychopaths.
If, however, there is no evidence to indicate that psychiatry has 
found a therapy for changing those individuals then the only available 
alternative will be the custodial care which, needless to say, is the 
function of the legal system. The traditional inclusion of the 
"psychopath" in the prison system offers options to the prison service 
to provide re-education rather than mere punishment. There is 
therefore the need for a legal framework within which such new 
educational facilities could be set up.
Insanity in England;
The defence of insanity as formulated in the M'Naqhten's Case 
(1843) is very limited because it excludes a wide range of mental 
abnormalities. The defence concentrates on defects of reasoning and 
ignores that a person may know the nature, quality and the wrongfulness 
of his act, and yet be classified by the medical professionals as 
severely mentally disordered.
In 1953, the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment recommended 
that: either (a) the Rules should be extended to include cases where the 
accused is labouring (as a result of disease of the mind) under an
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emotional disorder which makes him incapable of preventing himself from
committing an act, even though he is aware that it is wrong and
capable of appreciating its nature , or (b) the Rules should be
entirely abrogated and the jury given total discretion to determine
[611
whether he was so insane as not to be responsible for his actions.
The Commission's recommendations were not implemented and the only 
change introduced was the inclusion of diminished responsibility in the 
1957 Act.
However, as for psychopaths, the Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment concluded that:
"For the present we must accept the view that there is no 
qualititative distinction, but only a quantitative one, 
between the normal average individual and the psychopath, 
and the law must therefore continue to regard the psychopath 
as criminally responsible" [82]^
This exclusion of psychopaths from the categories of mentally 
abnormal offenders appears to be in line with the more recent exclusion 
of psychopaths proposed by the American Law Institute and the practices 
of the courts in Scotland. Further, the Royal Commission thought that 
it would be right for the Home Secretary to give greater weight to 
psychopathic personality as a ground for reprieve
This sounds more realistic than the present inclusion of 
psychopaths in mental hospitals where treatment is not available and 
where the discharge of the restricted patient is left to the Home 
Secretary rather than the hospital.
In any event,it has been largely accepted that the English defence
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of insanity with its emphasis on cognitive ability could not be 
applied to the psychopath who has no cognitive dysfunction.
Very recently the Committee On Mentally Abnormal Offenders (Butler 
Committee) proposed a new defence namely, "not guilty on evidence
of mental disorder". The grounds for this comprises two elements:
(a) a mens rea element approximating to the first limb of the 
M ’Naghten Rules.(Did he know what he was doing?? (b) specific 
exemption from conviction for defendants suffering from 
severe mental illness or severe subnormality at the time of 
the act or omission charged [^5]^
These two grounds cannot be applied to the psychopath who, as 
stated earlier, does not lack the capacity of knowing what he is doing 
and who is not suffering from severe mental illness or subnormality.
The Committees' proposed definition is equivalent to the present 
concept of psychosis and the psychopath is excluded by psychiatrists 
from this major category of mental illness.
Psychopathy as a Defence:
The recognition of psychopathy by the English Mental Health Act 
of 1959 gives the psychopath the opportunity to raise the defence 
of insanity within the meaning of M'Naghten Rules or the newer defence 
of "diminished responsibility".
To establish a defence on the grounds of insanity, it must be 
proved that at the time of committing the act the party accused was:
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"labouring under such a defect of reason from disease 
of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of 
the act he was doing or if he did know it he did not 
know he was doing what was wrong" [86]^
For the psychopath who knows what he was doing in quality and nature 
and who also knows the wrongfulness of his deeds, the M'Naghten Rules 
offer little protection from conviction. That is because the Rules 
are limited to cases of gross insanity and consequently ignore the 
category of "non-sane/non-insane" which includes psychopathic 
offenders. In addition the word "wrong" which is used in the Rules 
as synonymous with "punishable by law" does not refer to any question 
of abstract value which is relevant in the case of the psychopath 
who does not lack the mental capacity for distinguishing right from 
wrong but rather the basic moral capacity which is necessary for 
making the individual respect and abide by the law. The psychopath 
knows the illegality of his actions and that they are punishable by 
the law and consequently he is not protected by the Rules.
In practice, however, courts are trying to overcome this 
difficulty by interpreting the Rules with an increasing elasticity.
This attitude results in what is known as the doctrine of "irresistible 
impulse". The doctrine is simply that, if the accused is to be 
excused it must be proved that he is suffering from a disease of the 
mind which deprives him of the power of controlling his acts. Lawyers 
usually object to this on the grounds that there is the difficulty 
of distinguishing an irresistible impulse from an impulse which was not 
in fact resisted in the case of the psychopath we have already
seen that impulsivity is one of his characteristics but that it is not 
an outcome of mental illness or disease. Therefore, the doctrine of
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irresistible impulse cannot be applied to psychopaths since there 
should be according to the doctrine extraneous evidence of mental
illness apart from the anti-social conduct. More or less the doctrine
was not, and still is not, accepted as a defence by English courts.
Psychopathy and Diminished Responsibility
The English legislators, while trying to avoid the shortcomings 
of the Rules, introduced into English law the Scottish doctrine of 
"diminished responsibility" which has been available in Scotland since 
the nineteenth century The provision for the defence of diminished
responsibility was made by the Homicide Act of 1957. According to the 
doctrine a person whose act is attributable to mental abnormality may 
be held only partially responsible and this may be a mitigating factor 
in assessing punishment. Thus, on a charge of murder a finding of 
diminished responsibility reduces the charge to manslaughter.
The degree of abnormality required for the defence of diminished 
responsibility is defined in section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957:
"where a person kills or is party to the killing of another, he 
shall not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such 
abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of 
arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent 
causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially 
impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions 
in doing or being a party to the killing"
The criteria of diminished responsibility laid down in this 
section, were said to be vague and undefined. It is difficult, for 
example, to define what is normal, what is substantial and what is 
mental responsibility. Although this formulation appears to be 
allowing the courts a greater degree of flexibility, it still has its
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own problem. The requirement of proving that the accused's criminal 
conduct stems from or induced by inherent causes or disease is often 
difficult to satisfy. The jury will eventually rely on their own common 
sense in order to satisfy themselves whether the accused's criminal 
act stemmed from abnormality of mind.
During the introduction of the Homicide Bill in the Parliament 
one member (the Attorney General) raised the point that clause 2:
"...goes a little further than the doctrine does in Scotland"
This was later proved to be true and the doctrine was interpreted 
(particularly in the case of psychopaths) more favourably to the 
accused than the doctrinein Scotland. Another member (Major Lloyd 
George) suggest that clause 2:
"... is not intended, , to provide a defence to persons
who are merely hot-termpered, or who, otherwise normal, 
commit murder in a sudden access of rage or jealousy" L/OJ^
This suggestion is similar to the direction of Lord Cooper in
[711
the Scottish case H.M. Adv. v. Braithwaite . After the Homicide
Act was put into effect the English courts looked to the Scottish
cases for guidance and Lord Cooper's direction in Braithwaite has been
r 72]approved in the English cases
The diagnosis of psychopathy was made the basis of the defence of 
diminished responsibility for the first time in the case of Shirley 
Campbell The defence was successful in this case, but in several
cases it was not and the courts refused to accept psychopathy as a 
basis for the plea of diminished responsibility. But in Matheson's
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case the defence which was partly based on the diagnosis
psychopathy was accepted by the Court of Appeal. In that case the 
accused was charged with the murder of a boy aged 15 with whom he had 
a homosexual relationship. In the course of the trial, three doctors 
were called for the defence. They testified that the accused was a 
psychopath and of a mental age of less than ten years. The plea of 
diminished responsibility was rejected by the trial court and the 
accused was convicted of capital murder. The verdict was rejected by 
the Court of Criminal Appeal and substituted by one of manslaughter 
and the accused was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. The Lord 
Chief Justice who read the judgement of the Court said that:
"...there was unchallenged evidence that the appellant was 
within the provisions of section 2 of the Homocide Act, 
1957, and no evidence that he was not". [75]
It should be noted that in this case the decision of the 
Court of Criminal Appeal was not based on the accuracy of the diagnosis 
but rather on the basis that the medical evidence was not challenged. 
The mere fact that the medical evidence was accepted by the Appellate 
Court doesf not fully support the assumption that the court recognised 
psychopathy (alone) as the only basis for the defence of diminished 
responsibility. That is because there was the second possibility - 
which can be infered from the medical evidence - that Matheson could 
be diagnosed as mentally retarded or mentally subnormal (the psychia­
trists testified that he had a mental age of about 10 years). And if 
Matheson was tried in the 196Q's i.e. after the 1959 Act came into 
force, he would probably be diagnosed as mentally subnormal rather than 
as of psychopathic personality. Psychopathic disorder and mental sub­
normality are clearly separated in the 1959 Act.
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In the: later case of Yvonne Jennion the medical evidence
given in support of diminished responsibility was conflicting and, unlike 
that given in Matheson's case, was not all one way. In this case the 
accused killed her aunt in a fit of temper, striking her on the head 
with an ashtray, and strangling her manually and with a cord. The 
accused described the circumstances of the crime in a written statement 
in which she said: ".. I lost my temper and got mad and I picked up 
an ashtray....and I hit her on the back of the head and she fell on 
the chair..." At the trial the medical witnesses gave evidence in 
support of diminished responsibility. The prison doctor described her 
as a case of "possible schizophrenia in its early stages" . But the 
consultant psychiatrist who was called by the Crown to give rebutting 
evidence testified that "she had a psychopathic personality without 
psychosis and that she is very self-willed and her moral sense is weak". 
The defence of diminished responsibility was unsuccessful. The 
accused was found guilty of non-capital murder. She appealed and her 
appeal was refused.
It is clear from this case and the case of Matheson that psycho­
pathy in itself is insufficient for pleading diminished responsibility 
and that for its use in such a plea it needs to be linked with other 
extenuating factors.
F771It was, however, in the case of R.V. Byrne that the Court of
Criminal Appeal gave wider interpretation to the defence of diminished 
responsibility and made it clear that the defence can include irresis­
tible impulse. The medical evidence in Byrne's case was that, the 
accused,, who had strangled a young woman and mutilated her body, was a
91
psychopath and had long suffered from violent perverted sexual desires 
which he found difficult or impossible to control. The trial judge, 
who was not satisfied that the accused's conduct was influenced by 
mental disease, directed the jury that the medical evidence did not 
amount to a defence under the relevant section of the Act. Although 
the medical evidence given in this case was no more than a description 
of the accused's conduct (i.e. the medical evidence did not explain how 
the accused by reason of mental disease was deprived of the power to 
control his impulses). The Court of Criminal Appeal held that there 
had been a mis-direction by the judge and the accused was entitled to a 
defence.
The doctrine of irresistible impulse has faced many criticisms 
and recently the Butler Committee doubted whether it is possible to 
distinguish an irresistible impulse from an impulse which was not in 
fact resisted
The diagnosis of psychopathy c a n  , be accepted at  present by 
English courts as a basis for the defence of diminished responsibility 
if there is sufficient medical evidence to support the diagnosis. But 
as far as the present state of medical knowledge is concerned there is 
not enough medical explanation to support the idea that psychopathy is 
a mental illness. The term itself will remain no more than descriptive 
indicating that a person has certain personality characteristics. In 
these circumstances a defence of diminished responsibility based on the 
diagnosis psychopathy is unlikely to succeed unless the courts tend to 
accept the medical evidence not on grounds of plausibility but rather 
because the evidence was produced by a medical expert.*
^ ^ o m e  may argue that there might be sufficient medical evidence before the 
court, but this type of argument - appears to be somewhat arbitrary since 
it is particularly difficult, in the case of the psychopath, to draw a 
clear line between a mental and a moral defect.
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Finally if, however, the proposals, made by Butler's Committee, 
for the abolition of the provision for diminished responsibility were 
carried out then there is no chance for psychopaths to benefit from 
either insanity or diminished responsibility defences under English 
law.
The fact that Butler Committee recommended that psychopaths 
should only be subject to a hsopital order (section 60) if there is the 
"expectation of therapeutic benefit from hospital admission" indicates 
clearly that a medical disposal is not justifiable unless a person is 
first diagnosed as mentally disordered.
The Butler Committee believes that there is continuing uncertainty 
as to the treatability, in a medical sense, of the various conditions 
covered by the term "psychopathic disorder or of the methods to be
[79]
used" . In spite of this belief the Committee recommended medical
and psychological treatment for the less dangerous psychopaths only 
on the ground that the medical profession "has long association with the 
treatment of personality disorder"
This faith on the medical profession is also shared by the courts 
and English judges who are likely to continue to regard those individuals 
as mentally abnormal and as having special place in the criminal law.
The courts attitude is probably justified by ; first the common belief 
that the law recognises a middle ground between sanity and insanity; 
second that, psychiatric evidence is sometimes goes unchallenged and 
this implies that more weight should be given to it.
The Committee also recommended that the most dangerous categories
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of psychopaths should be sent to prison where they can receive 
education and training. This, however, suggests that psychopathy (even 
in its severe form) is primarily behavioural and social problem and its 
solution probably depends on the availability of efficient and workable 
educational and social techniques.
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CHAPTER 4
Summary and Conclusion
In the previous chapters we have looked in some detail on the 
definitions of "psychopathy" and discussed the various difficulties 
regarding psychiatric diagnosis and outlined the conclusions 
reached by a number of investigators who conducted researches and 
studies on the area and who suggest strongly the questionable useful­
ness of the psychiatric classifications. The problem of diagnostic 
validity which is common to all psychiatric categories is especially 
acute with respect to the diagnosis of "psychopathy". Although this 
diagnosis is mainly based on symptomatology, there is failure on the 
part of the diagnostician to specify adequately the relationship between 
symptoms and diagnosis. Usually, in practice, for establishing 
diagnosis the presence of all symptoms is not necessary. The patient 
does not have to possess all the typical symptoms but only some of 
them. Questions like; which are essential and which are not, how many 
must be present altogether, and which other symptoms must be absent, 
are not usually specified. Further, the problem of overlapping 
symptoms also creates great difficulty for there is no single symptom 
in "psychopathy" that is not found in many other states. For this 
reason many psychiatrists suggest that the sumptom-based classification 
will continue to be questioned. For example, Kendell (1975) pointed 
out that:
"There have in fact, been innumerable suggestions in the 
last forty years that classification on the basis of 
symptoms should be abandoned and replaced by an entirely r.-, 
new classification based on data of quite different kind"
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In any event, however, and under any psychiatric classification
the term "psychopath" which defines those with behavioural deviation
will remain incapable of constituting a properly medical condition.
The term is not useful in clarifying etiologic questions and for this
reason it is an invention rather than a discovery. As Szasz says:
"if we create categories, rather than discover them, how can we be
121certain that we have got things in the right classes?"
The reason for retaining this term throughout this dissertation is 
that, it is enshrined in the legislation and used by the courts. It 
exists in psychiatric literature and it is an expression that most 
English-speaking people understand.
The question of predicting the psychopath's future behaviour was 
breifly discussed and we have noticed the failure in the part of the 
diagnostician in predicting the "psychopath's future behaviour and 
dangerousness. We noted that psychiatrists are still not agreed on the 
existence of psychopathy as specific clinical entity and that this 
makes it very difficult to predict validly or to estimate the future 
risks of "psychopathic" behaviour. In order to find a solution to the 
problem an alternative approach has been suggested, the essence of 
which is to replace the professional psychiatric prediction by public 
adjudication. Focussing on the so-called "psychopathic personality" 
we noted the various characteristics of the disorder and their role 
in faulty interpersonal relationships and anti-social behaviour. We 
have seen that although these several characteristics are agreed upon by 
researchers, as signifying what is meant by psychopathy, it is not 
yet easy to distinguish the psychopath from the normal criminal. The
9 9
question regarding the etiology of this phenomenon was discussed by 
examining various theories regarding causation. We have seen that 
many investigators view scientific factors as playing the key role in 
the causation of this condition. In an attempt to reject the plausi­
bility of the medico-scientific explanation, evidence has been 
produced from various sources in order to show that this condition 
stems from inadequate upbrining rather than heredity, brain damage 
or disease. We noted that the phenomenon know in psychiatry, as 
"psychopathy" is an outcome of environmental influences in early 
childhood followed by socio-cultural influences in adolescence. As 
mentioned earlier, the conditions in modern societies nourish the anti­
social tendencies (which are already implanted during early childhood) 
in the individual and encourage them to flourish. The gaps which 
exist between stated values and actual behaviour create pressures and 
frustrations and may press heavily upon the individual during puberty 
and adolescence. Such experience will probably lead children who 
are growing up with too little restraint and too little sense of moral 
obligation, into trouble and socially unacceptable behaviour. It has 
been said that society creates its own deviants or that it has the 
criminals it deserves. This may not be far from the truth since 
society (any society) in terms of parents and others fails to provide 
a consistent and fair discipline and an atmosphere of affection to 
cover the needs of its own children. Children are good observers and 
they can perceive the inadequacies of their surrounding world. They 
are in a position to perceive that others do not adhere to their own 
stated ethical standards. Such inconsistent presentation of values 
may encourage not only the rejection of those values but also the
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anti-social tendencies in the individual. Needless to say, it is 
not mental illness or psychological disturbance that nourishes these 
tendencies but rather the impact of others (i.e. the example of the 
significant others). As Schur says;
" the very notion of an individual's "self" has little 
meaning apart from the subtle and continuous inter­
play a person experiences in relation to "significant 
others" in his environment from early childhood on. In 
all of his behaviour, the individual looks to others for 
cues, for recognition, approval, and support, for overt 
or covert reactions in the light of which he can remark 
himself so as to conform with the image he would like to 
project. It is understandable then that individual behaviour 
is strongly shaped both by directly experienced group inter­
action, and also by non membership "reference groups" from 
which a person almost imperceptibly seeks guidance in 
developing his own outlooks and patterns of activity"
Adolescent may learn by experience that society is not serious 
about its own moral standards and hence decide to embrace a "do your 
own thing" philosophy. His rationality cannot be denied though his 
reactions may be abhorred. Being exposed to such contradictory 
ethical standards, the adolescent eventually loses his sense of justice 
and learns, how to show his disrespect to law. Such a loss has a 
destructive effect on the individual and society. He cannot trust 
justice and cannot be trusted to recognise justice. And when he 
violates the rules, society, in the form of psychiatrists, labels him 
as anti-social and deprives him of his liberty because he is dangerous 
to himself and others. Society is mainly concerned with its own 
safety. But what about the safety of the individual who is the creation 
of that very society? The label cannot solve his problem or that 
of society. Its effect is harmful and may add to the stresses already 
experienced by the individual. It may lead the individual himself to
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accept the societal definition and to display increasingly such 
behaviour. Finally, other socio-cultural factors such as, socio­
economic pressures, the availability of illegitimate means to ends, 
disadvantaged-neighbourhood,bad companions and other relevant 
factors also play a part in encouraging the anti-social tendencies 
in the individual.
The possible argument against this sociological explanation of 
the problem may be that some people are born wicked i.e. biological 
influences create the criminal. One of the earliest exponents of 
this theory was the Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso who 
claimed that criminals were determined by their heredity and could be 
distinguished from non-criminals by prominent cheek bones and jaw, 
slanting eyes, receding brow, and large ears of a particular shape.
This contention was disproved by Karl Pearson early this century when 
he found that 3,000 criminals showed no significant differences of 
features from a similar number of students at Oxford and Cambridge 
It is important to note that these facial characteristics are found 
in persons suffering from a certain endocrine ■ disease known as "acro­
megaly" which is caused by excessive secretion of growth hormone
over a long period of time in an adult.
In recent times many constitutional and hereditary theories have 
been put forward to explain the origin of anti-social behaviour but 
none of these have won universal acceptance. These theories fail to 
produce evidence that criminals or anti-social persons can be distin­
guished from non-criminals by certain physical characteristics which 
influence their behaviour. Halleck explains this failure by stating that
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"Although constitutional and heredity theories assume in the 
organism a structural defect which allegedly influences 
behaviour , they fail to deal with the problem of how this 
influence is exerted. None of the theories deals with the 
problem of causality in terms of mechanism or dynamisms.
They either attempt to prove the presence of certain 
physical differences or simply allege that because they are 
present such differences are causes of crime. There is something 
almost mystical or demonological in this approach" [&].
Finally, by asserting that deviant behaviour is determined, these
theories ignore human volition and free-will and personal integrity.
They may encourage totalitarian methods of social control. For example,
in America the (in some states) compulsory sterilization of those
classified as psychopaths and feeble-minded criminals was legislated
for as a means of controlling these individuals and restraining them 
[71
from procreating
It is not surprising, therefore, that the adoption of such theories 
could lead to the use of the legal system itself to produce real 
injustice and social harm.
The legal position of "psychopaths"in England and Scotland was also 
dealt with, separately. The reason for this is that, the Scots have 
their own courts, legislation and legal concepts which differ fundament­
ally from those in England. We noted that the term "psychopathy" 
has not been used explicitly in the Scottish legislation whereas in 
England the concept is defined by the Mental Health Act 1959. Although 
the actual use of the term was avoided by the Scottish Mental Health 
Act (1960), the condition by implication remain as grounds for compul­
sory hospitilization As far as the question of responsibility
is concerned, we noted that there is no chance for "psychopaths" to
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benefit from the plea of insanity whether in England, where the test 
of McNaghten Rules covers only cases of gross insanity,or, even, in 
Scotland, where the Scottish approach to the plea of insanity is more 
liberal than allowed by the Rules. In England, the introduction of 
the Scottish concept of diminished responsibility by the Homicide 
Act (1957) provided an opportunity for the courts to avoid the 
rigidity of McNaghten Rules when dealing with "non sane non insane" 
categories. Under English law a diagnosis of "psychopathy" is recognised 
by the courts as an acceptable basis for a defence of diminished 
responsibility . But in many of the English cases already cited the 
decisions made by the courts clearly suggest that "psychopathy" in 
itself is insufficient for pleading diminished responsibility and that 
for the purpose of this defence it needs to be linked with other 
extenuating factors. In Scotland the courts remain sceptical and denied 
the application of the doctrine to "psychopaths".
Conclusion
We have already seen how society, in order to protect itself, 
forces some individuals, who display socially unacceptable behaviour, 
into contact with the psychiatrist, not because they are mentally ill 
but rather because they behave differently and do not conform to the 
existing social standards. Their behaviour is explained by labelling 
rather than by understanding. The diagnosis as we have seen it is not 
based on clear etiological knowledge. It is a mere description and 
therefore cannot tell why those individuals behave differently. By 
insisting that the condition is medical, (without producing evidence) 
psychiatrists are in fact neglecting the possibility of offering 
alternative and appropriate treatment for those individuals. Labelling
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a criminal or an anti-social person as a "psychopath" is tautological 
since the words 'criminality' and 'psychopathy' have become almost 
synonymous and it adds nothing to declare that a criminal is a criminal. 
The label is harmful to the individual because it may lead him to 
sustain an anti-social image of himself and it may cause him to 
suffer much from the stigma of (unproved) mental illness. It is 
embarrassing to society because society will face the possible accusation 
of using unsound totalitarian methods of control in dealing with its 
own delinquent children. The label is harmful to the psychiatric 
professionals themselves because they may be accused of acting as 
social agents who provide scientific explanations (of social deviance) 
required by a secular society, and whose social function is to use 
custodial rather than therapeutic measures. As Lader says:
" the concept of psychopathy is really part of the general 
strivings by an increasingly secular society to replace 
moral explanations of deviant behaviour by pseudo-scientific 
terms and to shuffle off on to medical people the responsibility 
for coping with such behaviour" [9].
There is no justification for this arbitrary labelling process 
except that, while the treatment of definable mental illness is the 
primary function of psychiatrists, some are trying to widen the ambit 
of psychiatry by asserting that all deviant behaviour should be 
regarded as sickness and thereby should be treated (rather than punished) 
rationally and humanely. The weakness of this argument is clear.
Treating social-deviants rationally and humanely does not necessarily, 
imply that we need to decide that they are mentally ill. Medical 
treatment is intended for medical conditions. Therefore, insisting 
on giving medical treatment in circumstances where no mental illness
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is proved, may itself be dangerous and inhumane since it may divert 
individuals away from other, more suitable kinds of treatment.
Furthermore, under the guise of medical treatment, those 
individuals are admitted involuntarily to mental hospitals and are 
usually locked up indefinately for their failure to conform to certain 
social standards. Implicitly, therefore, medical treatment is no 
more than requiring conformity. This attitude has been criticised 
by many including psychiatrists themselves. For example, the American 
psychiatrist Szasz wrote:
"As with the early Saint-Simonians and their later disciples, 
from Comte through Marx to Pavlov and Skinner, the individual 
should be allowed to exist only if he is socially well adapted 
and useful. If he is not, he should be "therapized" until he 
is "mentally healthy" - that is, uncomplainingly submissive 
to the will of the elites in charge of Human Engineering" [10]^
Lader produces many examples which illustrate how the pretensions 
of many psychiatrists can be exploited by a totalitarian regime like
f1 11that in Soviet Russia . He states that, in the Soviet Union:
"The courts almost invariably order the compulsory detention 
of political dissidents in special psychiatric hospitals which 
are reserved for those representing special dangers to society. 
Confinement is for an indefinite period until recovery" [12]^
But, of course, recovery is not attainable until the (patient) 
conforms to certain social standards that others define as necessary. 
Lader has quoted the following statement made by a Russian psychiatrist 
to one of his assumed dangerous patients;
"Listen, Borisov, you're a normal fellow and I am sure 
you don't want to be sent to a madhouse. Why don't 
you change your views?" [13]^
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In Britain, where the concept of psychopathy is recognised by 
the law as a medical condition the legislation empowers psychiatrists 
to participate crucially in locking-up people on the basis of anti­
social behaviour. But as a legal expression the concept of "psychopathy" 
is viewed by many as dangerously vague and imprecise. The Butler 
Committee declared that the concept is no longer useful or
meaningful, they suggested that the words "psychopathic disorder" 
should be deleted and replaced by the term 'personality disorder".
But this change will not solve the problem since the term 'personality 
disorder' indicates clearly that the condition lies within the ambit 
of psychiatry or psychology. Indeed, some may argue that personality 
disorders might be the province of the psychologist rather than the 
psychiatrist. But this is also vague and meaningless and could cover 
a wide range of disorders. In order to escape this difficulty the 
Committee recommended that those individuals should only be subject to 
a hospital order (sec, 60 of 1959 Act) if their disorder is believed
to be connected with a medical or psychological disorder and there is
r 15lthe expectation of therapeutic benefit from hospital admission 
But this will not solve the present problem. It may provide an 
opportunity for those who expect to find a medical explanation to the 
problem in the future. Perhaps by establishing experimental units.
As for the present, however , the recommendations make it clear that 
individuals classified by psychiatrists as "psychopaths" should not 
be admitted compulsorily to mental hospital unless there is evidence 
of a medical disorder believed to be connected with the anti-social 
behaviour.
Many disagree with these two recommendations and prefer that the
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term "psychopath" should remain and the definition of treatment should 
be widened to include care, training, the use of habllitative techniques 
and medical, nursing and other help. But in any event this will not 
improve the quality of psychiatric testimony in court. Indeed, without 
clear medical evidence to support it, the label conveys nothing to the 
judge or to the jury who depend more on their own perceptions and common 
sense. In addition the label gives the psychiatrist a greater role in 
the determination of responsibility which is basically the function of 
the court. Even the widening of the definition of treatment will not 
avail since we cannot prescribe treatment (of any kind) before knowing 
whom we treat. The idea that the term should remain in legislation 
suggests nothing except that the individual is labelled as both a 
"psychopath" and a criminal. To the layman, he is mentally ill 
because the medical profession defines him as such and he is a criminal 
because he broke the law and thereby defined by the law as a criminal. 
Such a combined stigma may seriously damage the individuals' future.
For this reason, the term 'psychopath' was not introduced into the 
legislations of Scotland and Northern Ireland.
As we have already seen, individuals labelled as psychopaths 
are regarded by psychiatry and law as mentally abnormal (i.e. deviating 
from normal standards). But abnormality is a relative concept, and as 
many have suggested,is entirely a matter of the observer's values which 
are the sole criterion of abnormality. But many individuals are law- 
abiders and conform to the norms and values of the community and yet 
experience , anxiety, depression and loss of personal happiness. Can 
we classify them as abnormal? Can we classify someone as abnormal 
or mentally ill only because he deviates from agreed standards of 
behaviour?
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The relativist may answer this question in the affirmative, viewing 
the concept of abnormality solely as deviation from social norms and 
consequently rejecting the notion of a "criminogenic society" in which 
the norms and goals are viewed as inadequate and unhealthy. With the 
relativist these individuals are abnormal because society defines them 
as such. But this defnition may cause great difficulty, for social 
norms may change with time, be replaced by news'® rules or even rejected, 
Such an approach cannot explain the behaviour of those arbitrarily 
defined as psychopaths and consequently cannot point to proper treat­
ment for them. The psychiatrist (who is a person with certain social 
and cultural background) may be faced with the dilemma of treating 
a patient with a different social or cultural background.
If the so-called psychopath can only be described in social terms 
then it is illogical to say that this phenomenon is based on a psychia­
tric condition. For this reason and for the reasons stated earlier 
the so-called psychopath, is simply a conscienceless individual who 
seeks (from an early age) the immediate gratification of impulses 
regardless of the consequences. That from an early age he was not 
taught to follow a certain code of conduct and growth simply makes him 
more and more that kind of person. He is not necessarily a member of 
a delinquent sub-culture, rich or poor, black or white, a president 
or a citizen. It is interesting to mention here that over the years 
psychiatrists and other writers have made attempts to classify 
prominent figures, politicians, military leaders and famous artists 
as cases of psychiatric disorder . In the 1960's the World Health 
Organization declared that:
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"individuals with psychopathic tendencies who are prone to 
exploiting power for selfish purposes .and have little concernr.,^ 
for ethical values or social stability often become leaders"
This, however, proves more the inconsistency of psychiatric diagnosis 
for the statement seems to suggest that the characteristics which 
would lead to a criminal being called a psychopath may be the very 
ones which make leaders of men. But we seldom call those world 
leaders, who possess these characterisitcs, psychopaths. Personal 
characteristics such as selfishness and lack of concern for ethical 
values cannot establish a psychiatric diagnosis. The statement may 
also seem to suggest that psychopathy is dependent for its diagnosis 
on the existence of certain types of criminality, since we seldom 
call world leaders psychopaths. But characteristics such as selfishness 
and lack of concern for ethical values, if found in any individual, 
are capable of producing every conceivable type of criminal and anti­
social behaviour. The reasonable man will call those individuals 
criminals or dictators and hardly needs psychiatric consultantion to 
declare that a criminal is a criminal.
Therefore the concept is useless in social and legal terms since 
it tends to equate law breaking and social deviance with mental illness. 
Moreover the imposition of such concepts will probably lead to the 
violation of the individual's freedom since the individual who is 
classified by the psychiatrist as a "psychopath" may be subjected to a 
restriction of his liberty for an indefinite period. Also the 
imposition of the label may be dangerous to his personal integrity 
since he may be susceptible to compulsory surgical procedures such as 
sterilisation and frontal lobectomy which may result in a serious
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damage to the health of the individual who may become a totally 
different person. Other methods such as E.C.T. and psychopharmacolo- 
gical treatment are also hazardous and uncertain. These violations 
of the individual's rights are usually justified by the need to protect 
the society and the individual himself. But is it justifiable to 
diagnose a sane criminal as mentally ill only because his behaviour 
transgressed the law. Is it justifiable to restrict his liberty - under 
the guise of medical treatment - to an unacceptable degree and without 
showing that the individual concerned has agreed to such procedure.
The harmful anti-social person will be locked up in any event under 
the standard rules of the criminal law. But he has the opportunity 
of regaining his liberty through, for example, appeals, reviews and so 
on. On the other hand, to treat someone as sick rather than criminal 
implies a greater restriction on liberty since the sick may be treated 
against their will or may be limited in their access to appeals, 
reviews or any other procedure. Therefore there is a greater restriction 
on liberty in the case of the compulsory patient. Criminal behaviour 
may extinguish certain individual rights but it does not generally 
extinguish all. The assumption that criminal behaviour can extinguish 
all individual rights implies that society in the form of authority 
has an absolute power over its citizens. This Hobbesian absolutism 
has its origin in the social contract theory. Hobbes as Campbell 
explains :
"suggests that, because it would be rational for men in a 
state of nature to enter into civil society, this 
justifies the sort of absolute political authority set 
up by the social contract" [17]^
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But the social contract can not be protected by absolute power. Indeed 
it can only be protected by the will of the dedicated contracting 
parties. Absolutism necessarily leads to the abuse of powers which 
may lead the individual to fight forces more brutal than the forces 
of nature. As Locke says:
" a rational person would not enter a contract in order to 
escape from polecats and foxes if this placed him at the 
mercy of lions" [1B]^
In modern societies, however, absolutism seems to have some influence in 
contemporary thought and in practices of many states. In many societies 
some individuals who are labelled as socially dangerous and whose 
behaviour transgresses the law are sometimes not punished proportionately. 
Instead they are sent to the psychiatrist who is empowered by the 
legislation to lock them up in a mental hospital for indefinite periods 
or to subject them to hazardous and irreversible surgical operations or 
drug treatment. The individual in these circumstances is deprived of 
all his rights. Admission and treatment are compulsory and segregation 
is indefinite. The justification given lies in the need to protect 
society from harm. Society (in the form of authority) therefore has 
absolute power over the individual. But if the authority (according 
to the social contract theory) is an apparatus created to secure the 
rights and interests of the individual, then it is the future and the 
welfare of the individual which is more important than the protection 
of the society.
As mentioned earlier, individuals who are classified by 
psychiatrists as "psychopaths", are presenting in the first place, 
a behavioural problem which is not an outcome of mental illness.
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If this is so then there is no logic in treating those individuals in 
mental hospitals. However, alternative methods such as reformatory 
institutions, and community homes with educational and training 
facilities, were suggested in Chapter 3. The suggested approach is 
intended to be less punitive and more reformatory. The reason for 
this is that, punitive measures cannot avoid stigmatizing people as 
criminals, the effect of which is that, the person so labelled will find 
it very difficult to re-enter the ranks of normality. Punitive 
measures may act in these circumstances as a contributory factor in 
deviant behaviour and eventually support the growth of an anti-social 
self image.
However, for treatment purposes, those individuals can be divided 
into two recognizable groups i.e. adult offenders (those over 16) and 
juvenile offenders (those under 16). Offenders over 16 should be dealt 
with by the criminal courts and if their guilt is proved, they should be 
sent by the court to spend the period of their sentence in reformatory 
institutions or in community homes which are supplied with proper 
educational and training facilities.
Offenders under 16 are essentially deprived children who need care, 
education and training. They should be dealt with by welfare committees 
who will co-operate with their families in order to propose a suitable 
form of treatment in a non-leaglistic atmosphere. It is worth mentioning 
here that, the recommendations of the Scottish Committee on Children 
and Young Persons which made radical changes in the whole system of 
juvenile justice in Scotland tend to support this approach. The 
recommendations of that Committee can briefly be summarized as follows:
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" All juveniles under 16 should be removed from the jurisdiction 
of the criminal courts and should be dealt with by a non­
judicial juvenile panel; juvenile panels are empowered to 
order special measures of education and training according to 
the needs of the juvenile concerned; A Director of Social 
Education would be appointed in each local authority to 
look after the needs of all children requiring measures of 
special education and training; hostels and residential homes 
would come under the authority of the Director of Social 
Education" [19]
_By making the whole business of dealing with children with problems 
an educational matter, these recommendations emphasize the responsibility 
of the community (especially families and educational institutions) 
towards its own children. The removal of the juvenile from the 
jurisdiction of the criminal courts is a rational and humane attitude 
because children will no longer be exposed to the harmful effects of 
labelling. The recommendations seem to suggest that placing these juven­
iles under the jurisdiction of the criminal courts may suggest that we 
are over-exaggerating the role of the legal system. Indeed dealing with 
the problems, of these juveniles, in a legalistic atmosphere is 
unrealistic since their problem is basically educational or social and 
cannot be solved by penal measures.
Finally, one related point needs to be emphasized. As far as the 
question of solving this problem is concerned, individuals as well as 
social factors had to be taken into account. The question of treating 
those individuals (juveniles and others) should not be allowed to over­
shadow the need for broader social reforms. There is a need to launch 
a direct action against crime-encouraging social conditions. The most 
important social factors that help generate crime can be generally 
stated :
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1. Lack of effective and consistent moral education (within 
the family, the schools and the social milieu).
2. Inequality, which usually result in poverty, lack of 
economic opportunities, racial discrimination and social 
and economic pressures.
3. Serious discrepancies between stated values and actual 
behaviour which create pressures and frustrations that lead 
the individual into criminal behaviour.
4. Bad and unjust laws.
5. Other relevant factors.
All these conditions need to be substantially reformed. Improve­
ment in moral education by adopting effective techniques and by estab­
lishing expanded guidance services together with improvements in 
economic and social situations (by enacting fair and just legislations) 
may help eventually in re-socializing those individuals before accepting 
for themselves the role of the criminal or the sick.
These solutions clearly suggest that the problem of the so-called 
psychopath is not the province of psychiatrists or psychologists. Social 
and environmental factors are the most crucial in determining the 
condition. The medical model was rejected because it ignores any 
social or ethical factors in its approach to behavioural problems.
Offenders whom we describe as psychopaths are not expected to return 
to society as law abiding citizens if their environment continue to 
be unhealthy and criminogenic. What is meant by this is that it is 
unreasonable to regard what psychiatrists termed as "psychopathic disorder"
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the misery of the individual alone. It is also the misery of his 
society which sometimes help to produce the anti-social and criminal 
behaviour. For this reason we need to provide for changing both 
the individual circumstances as well as social circumstances since 
there is always an interaction between individual personality and 
social experience. And as it has been suggested, sometimes society 
itself, whatever its racial, social, moral and economic conditions may 
happen to be, breeds new possibilities of violating its laws.
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Notes
1. Kendell, R., The Role of Diagnosis in Psychiatry, Oxford,
Osmey Mead, 1975, at p.47.
2. Szasz, T., Ideology and Insantiy, London, Calder and Boyars,
1973, at p. 190.
3. Schur, E., Our Criminal Society; The Social and Legal Sources 
of Crime in America, London, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969, at
p. 97.
4. "Pears" Cyclopaedia. 1977 ed.
5. See Joyce, D.B., et. al., 'Endocrine and Metabolic Diseases' 
in Macleod, J., (ed.), Davidson's Principles and Practice
of Medicine, (12th Ed.), Edinburgh, Churchill Livingstone,
1978, at p. 511; see also Rubenstein, D., et al.. Lecture 
Notes on Clinical Medicine, (2nd ed.)., Oxford, Blackwell 
Scientific Publications, 1980, at p. 147.
6. See Halleck, S.L., Psychiatry and the Dilemmas of Crime :
A Study of Causes, Punishment and Treatment, London,
University of California Press, 1971, at p. 16.
7. For more information and discussion see McLean, S.A.M.,
and Campbell, T.D., 'Sterilisation' in McLean, S.A.M., (ed.)., 
Legal Issues in Medicine, Gower Publishing Co., 1981, at p. 183; 
see also Meyers, D., The Human Body and the Law, Edinburgh 
University Press, 1970, at p. 46.
8. A psychopath over the age of 21 cannot be compulsorily admitted
to hospital under section 23 of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act
1960, but under section 175 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) 
Act 1975, a psychopath over 21, who has been convicted of a 
crime, can be admitted compulsorily to hospital.
9. Lader, M., Psychiatry on Trial, Harmondsworth, Penguine Books, 
1977, at p.37.
10. Szasz, op. cit., at p. 224.
11. Lader, op. cit., at p. 13.
12. ibid., at p. 154.
13. ibid., at p. 152.
14. Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders, Cmnd. 
6244/1975. Paras. 5.23 - 5.24.
15. ibid., Para. 5.40.
16. Quoted in Coleman, J.C., Abnormal Psychology and Modern Life.,
(4th Ed.)., Glenview, Scott, Eoresman & Co., 1976, at p.9.
17. Campbell, T.D., Seven Theories of Human Society, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1981, at p. 80.
18. Locke, John., The Second Treatise of Civil Government and A 
Letter Concerning Toleration, edited by Gough, J.W., Oxford,
Basil Blackwell, 1946, at p. 46, Quoted by Campbell, op. cit. 
at p. 84.
19. Report of the Committee on Children and Young Persons (Scotland), 
Cmnd 2306/1964, Paras. 139-91-241-242.
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